

Econ 3133 Microeconomic Theory II

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Department of Economics

Course Information

Instructor: Yangguang (Sunny) HUANG
Email: huangyg@ust.hk
Class time: Tue Thur 15:00-16:20 (Room 2503)
Office hour: Tue Thur 10:40-11:40 (LSK 6075)
Course website: canvas.ust.hk

Teaching assistant:
Email:
Tutorial time: Fri 16:30-17:20 (LSK 1007)
Office hour: (LSK 6066)

Textbook:
Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions, by Nicholson and Snyder (Required).
Intermediate Microeconomics with Calculus: A Modern Approach, by Hal R. Varian (Supplemental).

Grading:
- Homework assignments, 10%
- Midterm exam, 30%
- Final exam, 60%

For homework, group study is encouraged, but you need to turn in your own homework.
Final exam covers all the course materials (cumulative). Absence in an exam without a prior notification and a reasonable and verifiable justification will result in zero point for that part.

Other Information

Student Conduct and Academic Integrity (<http://acadreg.ust.hk/generalreg.html>)
Learning Environment (www.ust.hk/vpao/conduct/good_learning_experience.pps)
Center for Language Education (cle.ust.hk/)
Math Support Center (www.math.ust.hk/~support/)
The final course grade will be given by the University guideline (tpghandbook.ust.hk/course-grading).

Learning Goal

This is a sequel to the Microeconomic Theory I (Econ 3113). This two-part sequence is designed to provide a detailed study of basic topics in Microeconomics with a special emphasis on using a rigorous analytical approach. In Econ 3133, we study firms' behavior and market/strategic equilibrium in detail. Topics include firms' production and cost, competitive equilibrium and welfare, monopoly, game

theory and its application in Microeconomics. Emphases are placed on a rigorous analytical and mathematical approach, and multivariate calculus will be used extensively.

Per Program Intended Learning Objective (PILO) for [BSc in Economics and Finance](#), after completing this course, students will

1. Understand the logic, scientific basis, and critical thinking of economic analyses (PILO 1);
2. Have a sophisticated knowledge of economics, apply it to explain economic and social phenomena, and make sound economic decisions (PILO 4);
3. Develop ability to qualitatively analyze basic economic and social problems. Conduct basic economic analysis and research of the economy and society (PILO 4);
4. Collaborating effectively with your team members to answer questions in homework (PILO 5, 7);
5. Have informed ethical thinking based on rigorous economic and social analyses (PILO 8)
6. Be a lifelong user of economic analysis (PILO 9)

Outline and Schedule

Course Introduction and Math Review (1 lecture)

- One economic agent
 - Endogenous variable
 - Exogenous variable
 - Comparative statics
- Multiple economic agents
 - Strategic interaction
 - Equilibrium

Module 1. One Economic Agent: Profit-maximizing Firm (8 lectures)

- Production functions (Ch. 9)
 - Basic concepts
 - Labor versus capital: technical substitution and more
 - Discussion: machine replacing human and inequality
- Cost functions (Ch. 10)
 - Cost-minimization problem
 - Property of cost functions
 - Discussion: make or buy? the boundary of firm
- Profit maximization (Ch. 11)
 - Profit maximization of a price-taking firm
 - Profit maximization of a firm with market power
 - Marginal revenue and demand elasticity
 - Discussion: productivity

Module 2. Many Economic Agents: Competitive Market and Partial Equilibrium (3 lectures)

- Partial Equilibrium (Ch. 12)
 - Market demand and supply
 - Short-run market equilibrium
 - Comparative statics of market equilibrium
 - Long-run market equilibrium
 - Welfare analysis
 - Discussion: the invisible hand and the visible hand

- Monopoly (Ch. 14)
 - Monopoly behavior
 - Regulating monopoly
 - Price discrimination
 - Discussion: paradox in regulating monopoly

Midterm exam (1 lecture, the tentative date is Oct 17th)

Module 3. Multiple Strategic Economic Agents (12 lectures)

- Introduction to game theory (Ch. 8)
 - Simultaneous move game
 - Nash equilibrium
 - Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
 - Sequential move game
 - Subgame perfect equilibrium
 - Repeated game

- Imperfect competition (Ch. 15)
 - Cournot quantity competition model
 - Bertrand price competition model
 - Hotelling model
 - Stackelberg leader-follower model
 - Merger and collusion
 - Discussion: antitrust and competition policy

- Externalities and public goods (Ch. 19)
 - Externality
 - Public goods
 - Discussion: social welfare and public choice

Course Conclusion

Final exam