

IRIS W. HUNG and ROBERT S. WYER JR.*

Advertisements often stimulate consumers to imagine themselves in a situation in which they would personally benefit from using the product being advertised. However, when an advertisement is intended to induce consumers to benefit someone else (e.g., to donate money for relief of disaster victims), stimulating them to imagine themselves in the situation confronting the beneficiary can sometimes conflict with the image they form of themselves as a potential helper. This conflict in imagined perspective can decrease the advertisement's effectiveness. Five studies confirm this hypothesis. When participants took the perspective of the beneficiary at the time they read an appeal for help, characteristics of the appeal that increased the ease with which they could imagine the situation from this perspective (e.g., a picture of the victim) had a positive effect on both their urge to help and the amount of money they donated. However, when they had an a priori disposition to take the perspective of a potential donor at the time they read the appeal, these same characteristics decreased the appeal's effectiveness.

Keywords: charitable appeals, helping behavior, processing fluency, information processing, nonprofit marketing

Differences in Perspective and the Influence of Charitable Appeals: When Imagining Oneself as the Victim Is Not Beneficial

Advertisements often try to persuade consumers of the benefits they can derive from purchasing a product. To accomplish this, they often portray people enjoying themselves using the product in attractive surroundings and encourage consumers to imagine themselves in this situation. If consumers become "transported" into the situation (Green and Brock 2000), they are likely to have positive reactions to the experience they imagine and, therefore, to the product being promoted (Escalas 2004, 2007).

In these conditions, however, consumers themselves are the potential beneficiaries of their actions (purchasing the product being advertised). Special circumstances arise when someone else is the beneficiary. For example, charities often ask consumers to donate time or money for the

relief of victims of misfortune (e.g., a natural disaster, poverty, social exploitation). These appeals can also encourage consumers to imagine the situation to be remedied from the perspective of the people who will benefit from their actions. To be effective, however, recipients of the appeals must ultimately view the situation from the perspective of a potential donor and decide whether they want to help.

In some cases, recipients of a charitable appeal might not think of themselves as a donor until after they have learned about the situation to be remedied. For example, a televised public service announcement might initially call viewers' attention to the problem that needs to be remedied and might stimulate them to imagine the situation from the perspective of the people in need. Mail solicitations that begin with a description of the victim's plight could have a similar effect. In such cases, taking the victim's perspective is likely to increase recipients' appreciation of the need for help and, therefore, to increase the appeal's effectiveness.

In other instances, however, consumers imagine themselves as a potential aid giver before they receive a detailed description of the situation to be remedied. In some cases, for example, the first thing that recipients see when they

*Iris W. Hung is Assistant Professor of Marketing, Department of Marketing, National University of Singapore (e-mail: iris.hung@nus.edu.sg). Robert S. Wyer Jr. is Visiting Professor of Marketing, Department of Marketing, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (e-mail: mkwyer@ust.hk). This research was supported in part by grants HKUST6053/01H, HKUST6194/04H, and HKUST6192/04H from the Research Grants Council, Hong Kong. Chris Janiszewski served as associate editor for this article.

open a mail solicitation is a card that asks them how much they are willing to contribute, thus directing their attention to themselves as a potential helper. If they think of themselves in this capacity at the time they read about the situation to be alleviated but the description of the situation stimulates them to imagine it from the perspective of the victim, this latter perspective may conflict with their perception of themselves in the role of a potential donor that they constructed at the outset. It is difficult (if not impossible) to imagine the same situation from different perspectives simultaneously. In this case, therefore, characteristics of the appeal that induce recipients to take the perspective of the beneficiary could increase their difficulty in construing the appeal's implications and could decrease the appeal's effectiveness for reasons suggested by Schwarz (2004), which we elaborate on subsequently.

Five experiments examine these possibilities. Participants read an appeal either to help in combating child trafficking or (in Experiment 5) to make an organ donation. In Experiments 1–3, the appeal was written from the perspective of a potential beneficiary (e.g., a trafficking victim). However, it was accompanied in some conditions by a picture of the victim, which increased the vividness of the situation participants were likely to imagine if they took this perspective. These experiments show that when an appeal began with a description of the victim's plight, providing a picture of the beneficiary increased participants' willingness to help. When the appeal asked participants if they would be willing to help at the outset, however, increasing the vividness of the situation confronting the beneficiary decreased their willingness to help. Experiment 4 validates our interpretation of the effects we obtain in Experiments 1–3 by directly manipulating both the perspective from which the appeal was written and the perspective that participants were asked to take when reading it. Finally, Experiment 5 demonstrates that analogous effects of conflicting perspectives can occur when consumers are disposed to imagine a situation from the perspective of a beneficiary but the appeal is written from the perspective of a potential donor.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Motivational Determinants of Helping Behavior

The willingness to donate money or other resources to a charity is undoubtedly influenced by factors that affect helping behavior in general. These factors include a person's liking for the potential beneficiary (Emmons and McCullough 2004), feelings of social or personal responsibility (Darley and Latane 1968), and feelings of obligation to reciprocate benefits received in the past (Schwartz 1967). The willingness to make a donation can also be influenced by a person's desire to believe in a just world (Lerner and Simmons 1966; Miller 1977) or to affirm his or her self-perception as a helpful person (Langer and Abelson 1972).

The motivation to alleviate personal distress can also be an antecedent of helping (Cialdini et al. 1987). For example, people sometimes help others to eliminate the negative emotions they experience when thinking about people in need and the situation confronting them (Bagozzi and Moore 1994; Cunningham, Steinberg, and Grev 1980). Thus, people are more willing to help when they expect to receive feedback that their efforts have been successful (Smith, Keating, and Stotland 1989).

People's helping decisions can be influenced by their empathy with people in need of help (their vicarious experience of the thoughts and feelings of another) or their identification with these people (the establishment of a subjective connection between the self and another or, alternatively, a merging of the self with the other) (Aron and Aron 1986; Batson and Shaw 1991; Cialdini et al. 1997; Hornstein 1982). Which factor, empathy or identification, exerts the predominant influence on helping is somewhat controversial (Batson, Early, and Salvarani 1997; Cialdini et al. 1997). In the research reported herein, we induced participants to take the perspective of a victim of misfortune either by explicitly instructing them to do so (Batson et al. 1997; Petrova and Cialdini 2005) or by self-referencing (e.g., using "you" rather than third-person pronouns when referring to the people in need of help; see Escalas 2007). In some cases, we further increased participants' disposition to take the victim's perspective by providing a picture of the people in need. However, whether identification, empathy, or neither mediated the effects of this disposition was not critical to our conceptualization.

Perspective Effects on Helping Behavior

The research we summarized in the preceding section focuses primarily on motivational determinants of decisions to help. Without denying the effects of these motivational factors, we are concerned with cognitive influences on these decisions. To reiterate, people who contemplate making a donation may consider the situation at hand from either the perspective of the people in need of help or that of a potential donor. The adoption of either perspective could have a positive impact on helping decisions. For example, the effect of taking the victim's perspective is implied in the research by Batson and colleagues (1997). A field study by Langer and Abelson (1972) also demonstrates the impact of taking the donor's perspective. People in a shopping mall were approached by a woman who was limping badly and asked them either (1) to call her husband to pick her up (suggesting that the need was important) or (2) to call her boss and tell him that she would be late for work (an unimportant and, thus, inappropriate request to make of a total stranger). In some cases, the woman first described her injury, thus focusing shoppers' attention on the woman herself. In this case, shoppers' compliance with her request depended on its importance. In a second condition, however, the woman made her request before describing her injury, thus focusing shoppers' attention on themselves. In this condition, shoppers' compliance was apparently based on their desire to maintain an image of themselves as a helpful person. Consequently, it was not a function of the request's importance.

In Langer and Abelson's (1972) study, people apparently considered the situation from the perspective of either themselves (the helper) or the victim, but not both. Thus, participants who imagined themselves from the helper's perspective were inclined to provide assistance independently of other considerations. The victim's one-sentence description of her plight may not have been sufficient to induce participants who had taken the helper's perspective to consider the situation from the victim's perspective as well. Written appeals may also not stimulate readers to take the victim's perspective spontaneously. However, the tendency to take the perspective of the victim can be increased

by explicitly asking readers to imagine themselves as the people in need (Batson et al. 1997; Petrova and Cialdini 2005) or by using self-referencing (Escalas 2007). It may also be increased by accompanying the written description of the situation with a picture of the victims or the circumstances confronting them, thus making the victim's situation more salient. Under these conditions, therefore, the likelihood of considering the situation from the victim's perspective may be particularly likely.

Ultimately, to make a decision about whether to help, consumers must consider themselves potential donors at some point. The two perspectives may sometimes be adopted sequentially. That is, consumers who imagine themselves as a victim might recognize the victim's need for help, and in turn, this might lead them to consider being a potential aid giver. In other cases, however, a solicitation can sometimes begin with an explicit request for help and only subsequently describe details of the situation to be alleviated. Furthermore, people who receive an appeal in the mail may spontaneously recognize it as a request for help and consider the situation from the perspective of a potential donor before they receive information about the specific problem to be remedied. In such cases, a description of the situation from the perspective of the beneficiaries could create cognitive conflict, as it is impossible to imagine the situation from two perspectives simultaneously. This conflict could interfere with an evaluation of the appeal's implications and thus could decrease its effectiveness.

This possibility becomes important in light of evidence that difficulty in processing information can have a negative impact on the effect of this information (see Schwarz 2004). For example, people report having a higher likelihood of contracting a disease if the disease is easy to imagine than if it is difficult (Sherman et al. 1985). People also evaluate a product less favorably if they find it difficult to generate favorable attributes about it, independently of the number they actually identify (Menon and Raghuram 2003; Wänke, Bless, and Biller 1996). Similarly, they are less willing to make a choice if the decision alternatives are described in a font that is difficult to read (Novemsky et al. 2007). Direct evidence that the difficulty of processing information about a stimulus decreases the favorableness of evaluations of the stimulus has been obtained in research on the neurological correlates of judgment (Winkielman and Cacioppo 2001; Winkielman et al. 2006).

If the perspective people take at the time they read an appeal is the same as the perspective from which the appeal is written, characteristics of the appeal that make it easy to imagine the situation from this perspective are likely to increase its impact. If people's perspective at the time they encounter an appeal differs from the perspective from which the appeal is written, however, characteristics of the appeal that increase the tendency to imagine the situation from this perspective are likely to decrease its effectiveness. The following experiments provide evidence of these effects and the processes underlying them.

EXPERIMENTS 1–3

Participants in Experiments 1–3 read an appeal for money to combat child trafficking. To increase the likelihood that all participants would imagine the situation from the perspective of trafficking victims, we personalized the

appeal. (It asked readers to imagine themselves in the situation described and referred to “you” when describing the situation.) However, we manipulated the vividness of the image participants were likely to construct of the situation by either presenting a picture of a trafficking victim or not.

We also manipulated the perspective participants were likely to take at the time they read the appeal. In some conditions, the advertisement began with a description of the problem to be remedied, and an explicit request for help was not made until after this description was provided. In this case, we expected participants to read the appeal from the perspective of the victim. Consequently, providing a picture of the victim should increase the vividness of the situation participants imagined and should increase the appeal's effectiveness. In other conditions, however, the appeal began with the statement, “Would you like to help?” We assumed that this situation would induce an a priori disposition to adopt the perspective of a potential donor and that this perspective would conflict with the perspective from which the victim-focused problem description was written. In these conditions, therefore, a picture of the victim should increase the conflict between the two perspectives participants experience at the time they read the appeal and, therefore, should decrease the appeal's effectiveness.

Experiment 1 confirms the hypothesized effects of perspective we described in the preceding paragraph. The next two experiments, which are identical to the first except for the dependent variables we assess, provide further evidence of these effects and obtain other data that are necessary (1) to evaluate our assumptions regarding the processes underlying the effects, (2) to eliminate alternative interpretations of the findings, and (3) to establish the generalizability of the findings to actual donation-giving behavior. We first describe the procedure used in all three experiments and the dependent variables that are common to them. We then present and discuss the results of each experiment in turn, describing additional dependent variables as they become relevant.

Design and Procedure

Undergraduate student business majors participated in Experiments 1–3 to fulfill a course requirement. We randomly assigned them to four cells of a 2 (request order: request first versus problem first) \times 2 (pictures: present versus absent) design. Ninety-three participants took part in Experiment 1, 59 in Experiment 2, and 54 in Experiment 3.

Participants in each experiment were told that the study was designed to investigate how people process information of the sort they encounter in daily life and that to accomplish this, we wanted to obtain their reactions to an actual advertisement from a charitable organization, Pangaea. Each participant then received a questionnaire booklet containing one of four appeals. In request-first conditions, the first page of the booklet contained a single statement, “Would you like to help?” along with a logo of the organization. This was followed on the second page by a description of the problem:

The buying and selling of children is a lucrative international trade. Imagine that you and others you know are among the estimated 1.2 million children who are sold each year by their families to be used for sex and labor. Your parents, like those of other children, might

be unaware of its dangers, believing that you might have the chance for a better life outside your own country. Like other forms of criminal activity, trafficking is an underground activity and is difficult to address.

In the picture conditions, the problem description was preceded at the top of the page by a black-and-white photograph of an ostensible victim of child trafficking, whereas in the no-picture conditions, we did not provide the photograph.

The procedure and stimulus materials in problem-first conditions were identical, except that the page of the questionnaire containing the statement "Would you like to help?" was inserted after the description of the problem rather than before. After reading the advertisement, participants turned over the page and responded to four items that were common to all three experiments. They were told to imagine that representatives of the charitable organization were visiting the university to solicit money for the prevention of the problem and were asked to indicate how much money they would personally be willing to donate if they had HK\$500 (US\$65) in their pocket. Then, in Experiment 1, we asked them whether while reading the appeal they imagined being (1) a potential donor who helped out by making a donation or (2) one of the children being trafficked. Finally, they were asked to indicate their urge to help. These three items were reported along scales ranging from 0 ("not at all") to 10 ("very much").

In Experiments 2 and 3, the questions were identical, except that participants reported their urge to help before estimating the extent to which they imagined themselves as the donor or the victim. (As we show subsequently, the

results were identical in each case.) We discuss other dependent variables assessed in these experiments along with the results.

Results: Experiment 1

We expected that when participants read the appeal without first being asked to help, presenting a picture of the victim would increase their tendency to imagine the situation from the victim's perspective and consequently would increase their willingness to help. When they were asked for help at the outset, however, we expected that the perspective activated by this request would conflict with the perspective activated by the appeal itself, thus increasing difficulty in construing the implications of the appeal and decreasing its effectiveness.

Perspective taking. We summarize participants' reported tendencies to imagine the situation from each perspective in the first two sections of Table 1, Column A, as a function of request order and the presence of a picture. The effects of pictures on participants' tendency to imagine themselves as the victim appear graphically in the first panel of Figure 1, Column A, which conveys the effect of pictures in each order condition (the difference in judgments when a picture was presented and when it was not). When participants read the appeal without first being asked if they would make a donation, pictures increased their tendency to imagine themselves as the victim. When they were asked to help at the outset, however, and presumably experienced conflict with the perspective they took while reading the appeal, pictures decreased their tendency to imagine themselves as the victim. The interaction of these directionally opposite effects was significant ($F(1, 89) = 8.63, p < .001$).


Table 1

EXPERIMENT 1-3: IMAGINED PERSPECTIVES AND DONATION-RELATED MEASURES AS A FUNCTION OF REQUEST ORDER AND THE PRESENCE OF A PICTURE

	A: Experiment 1		B: Experiment 2		C: Experiment 3	
	Picture	No Picture	Picture	No Picture	Picture	No Picture
<i>Tendency to Imagine Self as Victim</i>						
Problem first	5.70 _a	3.82 _{bc}	5.40 _a	3.47 _{bc}	5.93 _a	4.00 _{bc}
Request first	2.86 _c	4.63 _{ab}	3.00 _c	4.73 _{ab}	3.15 _c	5.21 _{ab}
<i>Tendency to Imagine Self as Donor</i>						
Problem first	6.13	5.23	3.80	4.93	4.93	4.14
Request first	5.46	5.42	4.79	4.47	5.15	4.21
<i>Urge to Help</i>						
Problem first	6.79 _a	5.46 _b	6.73 _a	5.33 _{bc}	6.93 _a	5.14 _b
Request first	5.25 _b	6.63 _{ab}	4.07 _c	5.47 _b	3.77 _c	5.43 _b
<i>Estimated Donation (\$)</i>						
Problem first	146.67 _a	116.82 _{ab}	176	104	88	91
Request first	115.36 _{ab}	87.90 _b	74	115	74	68
<i>Actual Donation (\$)</i>						
Problem first	—	—	—	—	27.14 _a	10.00 _{ab}
Request first	—	—	—	—	2.31 _b	18.27 _{ab}
<i>Imagination Difficulty</i>						
Problem first	—	—	3.00 _a	5.40 _b	—	—
Request first	—	—	7.57 _c	5.47 _b	—	—

Notes: Cells with unlike subscripts differ at $p < .05$.

Figure 1
EXPERIMENTS 1-3: EFFECTS OF PICTURES ON DEPENDENT MEASURES AS A FUNCTION OF REQUEST ORDER



Although the effect of pictures on participants' tendency to imagine themselves as the victim was consistent with expectations, a possible ambiguity in interpreting these findings is that participants in the absence of a picture were less likely to imagine themselves as the victim under problem-first conditions than under request-first conditions (see Table 1, Column A). We observed a similar difference in the next two experiments as well. This could suggest that personalizing the appeal alone was insufficient to stimulate participants to imagine the situation from the victim's per-

spective and that a picture was necessary to provide this stimulation. We elaborate on this possibility further in the "General Discussion" section.

As we expected, similar effects on participants' tendency to imagine themselves as the donor were not evident. That is, all participants necessarily imagined themselves as a potential donor at the time they made a decision of whether to help, regardless of the perspective they took at the time they read the appeal. Consequently, the manipulation of perspective should not have much effect on their postdeci-

sion judgments. Consistent with this hypothesis, participants reported imagining themselves as the donor in all conditions ($M = 5.56$), and this tendency did not depend on either request order or the presence of pictures (in all cases, $p > .10$).

Desire to help. The third section of Table 1, Column A, summarizes participants' urge to help, and the second panel of Figure 1, Column A, graphically represents the effect of pictures on these judgments. The interaction of request order with picture conditions was significant ($F(1, 89) = 9.64, p < .01$) and of the form we expected. Specifically, pictures increased participants' urge to help when they viewed the advertisement without having first been asked to make a donation, but they decreased participants' urge to help when the request was made at the outset.

However, a similar effect on the amount of money donated was not evident. As the fourth section of Table 1 indicates, in general, participants were willing to donate more money when a picture was presented than when it was not (\$131 versus \$102). This difference was not significant and was similar regardless of request order. Nevertheless, a multivariate analysis involving both dependent variables was reliable ($F(2, 88) = 6.91, p < .01$).

Another aspect of our results deserves comment. Our conceptualization assumes that people tend to be more influenced by appeals in problem-first conditions (in which no perspective conflict exists) than in request-first conditions. This might be expected to be true regardless of the presence of a picture. However, as Table 1, Column A, shows, participants in the absence of a picture reported less of an urge to help in the former condition (5.48 versus 6.63; $F(1, 89) = 3.23, p < .08$). A similar difference, though much lower in magnitude, was also evident in the next two experiments we report. This could be attributable in part to the relatively low tendency for a person to imagine him- or herself in the role of the victim in this condition. However, it is also worth considering in light of Langer and Abelson's (1972) findings we noted previously. To reiterate, Langer and Abelson find that when people were asked for help before learning about the victim's need, they were stimulated to think of themselves as helpful, and this led them to provide help independently of the importance of the request. A similar effect might have occurred in the current study, offsetting the effects of perspective conflict when the situation confronting the victim was not highly imaginable. However, providing a picture increased the vividness of the situation when it was viewed from the victim's perspective and led the effects of perspective conflict to be more evident, as our results indicate.

Results: Experiment 2

A central assumption of our conceptualization is that participants in request-before conditions experience difficulty when trying to imagine the situation from two perspectives simultaneously and that this conflict is greater when a picture is provided that makes the victim's perspective more dominant. Although the results of Experiment 1 were consistent with this assumption, direct evidence for its validity is desirable.

Experiment 2 provides this evidence and evaluates several alternative interpretations of our findings. First, people who are asked for help at the outset might anticipate that the message to follow is intended to persuade them and

therefore might activate their persuasion knowledge about how to cope with such a message (Campbell and Kirmani 2008; Friestad and Wright 1994). Thus, the message could induce reactance that increases when the appeal appears heavy-handed (Brehm 1966). For this reason, providing a picture of the victim could increase this reactance and decrease the urge to make a donation.

Second, the effects we obtained could result in part from differences in the disposition to identify with the victims or, alternatively, to empathize with them (Batson et al. 1997; Cialdini et al. 1997). Participants in our studies were Chinese, and so it seemed intuitively unlikely that providing a picture would increase their tendency to identify with the victim (who was a black African child). It nevertheless seemed desirable to examine this possibility further and to determine whether the effects we observed were mediated by the disposition to empathize or sympathize with the victims rather than by perspective conflict per se.

To evaluate these possibilities, after completing the measures administered in Experiment 1, participants responded to several additional items pertaining to imagination difficulty, identification and empathy with the victim, and reactance. We describe these measures in the context of the data.

Perspective taking. The effects of pictures on participants' reports of their disposition to imagine themselves as the victim replicated those we observed in Experiment 1. These effects, which we summarize in Table 1, Column B, also appear graphically in Figure 1, Column B. That is, providing a picture of the victim increased participants' tendency to imagine themselves as the victim when the victim's plight was described first but decreased this tendency when the request for help was made at the outset. The interaction of request order with picture conditions was significant ($F(1, 55) = 8.95, p < .01$). In contrast, participants' tendency to imagine themselves as the potential donor did not vary over conditions ($p > .10$).

Desire to help. Participants' reported urge to help and the amount of money they reported being willing to give appear in the third and fourth sections of Table 1, Column B. As Figure 1, Column B, shows, providing a picture significantly increased the urge to help in problem-first conditions and significantly decreased the urge to help in request-first conditions. The interaction of picture conditions with request order was significant ($F(1, 55) = 8.56, p < .01$). The amount of money participants were willing to donate showed a similar pattern. Although the interaction of picture conditions with request order was not significant in an analysis of these data alone ($p > .10$), it was reliable in a multivariate analysis involving both urge to help and donation amount ($F(2, 54) = 4.54, p < .02$).

Imagination difficulty. Our interpretation of the results assumes that participants who receive a request for help at the outset experience difficulty processing an appeal made from the perspective of the victim and that a picture of one of the victims increases this difficulty. To obtain data pertaining to this assumption, after completing the main dependent measures in this experiment, participants reported their agreement with the following statement: "I found it difficult to imagine myself as one of the children being trafficked" (0 = "not at all," and 10 = "very much").

Participants' estimates of the difficulty they experienced in imagining themselves as the victim appear in the third

section of Table 1, Column B. In request-after conditions, providing a picture of the victim significantly decreased the difficulty with which they could imagine themselves as a victim ($M_{diff} = -2.40$). When a request for help was made at the outset, however, providing a picture significantly increased this difficulty ($M_{diff} = 2.10$). The interaction of picture conditions with request order was significant ($F(1, 55) = 14.50, p < .001$). These data are consistent with our perspective conflict hypothesis.

Mediation analyses provide further confirmation of this conclusion. Based on the procedures that Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest, analyses showed that the urge to help was significantly related to imagination difficulty ($\beta = -.37, SE = .09, p < .01$). However, although analyses of urge to help as a function of picture conditions, request order, and the interaction of these variables yielded a significant interaction effect ($\beta = -.70, SE = .24, p < .01$), introducing imagination difficulty into the equation reduced the effect to nonsignificance ($\beta = -.41, SE = .26, p = .16$).

Identification with the victim. Differences in identification with the victim also cannot account for our findings. We assessed identification in the manner employed by Aron, Aron, and Smollan (1992). Participants were given seven pairs of circles that varied in their degree of overlap and were asked to circle the pair that “best described [their] relationship with one of the children being trafficked.” Responses were assigned a value from 1 to 7, with high scores indicating greater identification. Indeed, providing a picture decreased identification with the victim (1.97 versus 2.60 in picture versus no-picture conditions; $F(1, 55) = 3.87, p < .05$). Because the child shown in the picture was African and the participants in the study were Chinese, this is perhaps not surprising. Nonetheless, the effect of pictures was virtually identical, regardless of whether the request was made first (2.07 versus 2.73, respectively) or not (1.87 versus 2.47, respectively).

Empathy and sympathy. To assess the possible effects of empathy and sympathy, participants responded to two measures employed by Escalas and Stern (2003). The sympathy scale consists of statements pertaining to people’s understanding of the situations confronting the characters in the advertisement. The empathy scale consists of statements pertaining to people’s experience of the characters’ feelings. We administered the two scales in a counterbalanced order and averaged responses to the items constituting each scale to provide a single index of sympathy ($\alpha = .86$) and empathy ($\alpha = .90$). Neither sympathy nor empathy was significantly affected by either request order or the presence of a picture (in all cases, $p > .10$). If anything, participants reported greater sympathy and empathy when the request for help was first (1.07 versus $-.03$, respectively) than when the problem was conveyed first (.74 versus $-.56$, respectively). However, the effect of presenting a picture had no appreciable effect on sympathy or empathy in any condition ($F < 1$).

Reactance. We collected additional data to evaluate alternative interpretations of our findings. To provide an indication of reactance, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they tried to avoid being influenced by the advertisement and whether they thought the advertisement was a “hard sell.” Responses to these items, along a scale from 0 to 10, were correlated at .50 and were averaged. Analyses of participants’ reactance to the advertisement

yielded no significant effects (in all cases, $F < 1$). Although participants reported slightly greater reactance when a picture was presented than when it was not, this difference was not significant and was similar in magnitude under both request-first conditions (4.79 versus 4.17 in picture versus no-picture conditions) and problem-first conditions (3.40 versus 3.34).

Results: Experiment 3

Although our manipulations in Experiments 1 and 2 had the effect we expected on participants’ reports of their urge to help, they had little consistent effect on participants’ estimates of the amount of money they would donate. However, it seemed possible that in the absence of actually being required to make a donation, participants did not bother to think carefully about the amount of money they would donate. Furthermore, their responses might have been influenced by social desirability considerations rather than by the appeal they read. To ensure that our findings have implications for situations outside the laboratory, we obtained actual monetary donations from participants in this study.

Specifically, after receiving information and completing measures identical to those in Experiment 1, participants were told that the experiment was over. Before leaving, however, participants were given a note along with an envelope and were told the following: “We [the researchers] are going to raise money for the organization. If you wish to donate, please put your money inside the envelope enclosed. If not, please leave the envelope on your desk. We will collect the money from you and donate to the organization. We can give you a receipt if you want.” (No participant requested a receipt. The money we collected was sent to the charitable organization, Pangea, as promised.)

Perspective taking. Participants’ estimates of the extent to which they imagined feeling like the victim replicated the results of Experiments 1 and 2 (see Table 1, Column C). As Figure 1, Column C, shows, pictures increased participants’ tendency to imagine themselves as the victim when they read about the problem before being asked if they were willing to help, but pictures decreased this tendency when participants were asked to help at the outset. The interaction implied by these differences was significant ($F(1, 51) = 9.02, p < .004$). In contrast, pictures had no appreciable effect on participants’ tendency to imagine themselves as a donor ($p > .10$).

Desire to help. The effects of pictures on participants’ urge to help were also replicated. As Table 1, Column C, and Figure 1, Column C, show, pictures increased the urge to help in problem-first conditions but decreased this urge in request-first conditions. The interaction implied by these directionally opposite effects was significant ($F(1, 51) = 10.07, p < .01$).


Finally, although participants’ estimates of the money they would hypothetically donate were not influenced by either request order or pictures ($F < 1$) (see Table 1, Column C), the actual amount of money participants donated at the end of the experiment was affected, as we expected. When participants read about the problem before being asked if they were willing to help, they donated more money when they saw picture of the victim than when they did not. When participants were asked if they would be willing to help at the outset, however, they contributed less money if

they saw a picture than if they did not. The interaction of picture conditions with request order was significant ($F(1, 51) = 5.53, p < .02$).

Path Analyses

We further evaluated the processes we assumed to underlie donation motives under the two perspective conditions using path analyses. To obtain a sufficiently large sample, we pooled data over all three experiments. The complete model we tested in each perspective condition appears in Figure 2 for both request order conditions. In each case, we denote significant and nonsignificant paths with solid and dashed lines, respectively. When participants were not primed at the outset to think about making a donation, the presence of pictures had a positive influence on their tendency to imagine themselves as the victim, which then influenced their disposition to imagine themselves as a

Figure 2
EXPERIMENTS 1–3: RESULTS OF PATH ANALYSES



* $p < .05$.
** $p < .01$.
*** $p < .001$.

potential helper. Imagining themselves as both a helper and a victim affected their urge to help. However, the influence of urge to help on the amount of money participants were willing to donate was unreliable.

When the appeal began with a request to help, thus inducing perspective conflict, the results were similar, with one important exception. That is, pictures had a negative impact on participants' tendency to imagine themselves as a victim. This is consistent with our expectation that increasing the vividness of the situation confronting the victim interfered with processing in this condition.

EXPERIMENT 4

Experiments 1–3 provided converging evidence that when consumers are asked if they are willing to assist the victims of misfortune, they adopt the perspective of a potential helper. Consequently, they experience conflict between this perspective and the perspective elicited by the victim-focused description of the problem they encounter subsequently. Consequently, the appeal is less effective than it would be in the absence of this conflict.

Two further considerations arise in interpreting these results. First, our manipulation of the different perspectives participants might take in reading an appeal was indirect. To confirm our interpretation of these data, a more direct manipulation of these perspectives is desirable. Experiment 4 accomplishes this.

Second, all the appeals we constructed for Experiments 1–3 were personalized, and we used a picture to increase the vividness of the representation that was likely to be formed of the situation from the victim's perspective. This strategy was desirable in some respects because it controlled for the content of the appeal itself. To establish the effect of personalization per se, however, we employed both personalized and impersonal appeals in Experiments 4 and 5.

Method

We randomly assigned 48 undergraduate students to one of four conditions of a 2 (imagined perspective: helper versus victim) \times 2 (type of appeal: personalized versus impersonal) design. We introduced participants to the study with instructions identical to those employed in Experiment 1. Participants in donor-perspective conditions were told to imagine that they were in a position to assist the people in need as they read the advertisement. In contrast, participants in victim-perspective conditions were told to imagine that they were one of the victims.

We then exposed participants to one of two versions of an appeal for money to help eliminate the trafficking of African children. In personalized-appeal conditions, the advertisement was identical to that which we presented in no-picture, personalized conditions of our prior experiments. In impersonal-appeal conditions, the information was conveyed in the third person:

The buying and selling of children is a lucrative international trade. An estimated 1.2 million children are sold each year by their families to be used for sex and labor. Parents are often unaware of its dangers, believing that their children might have the chance for a better life outside their own country. Like other forms of

criminal activity, trafficking is an underground activity and is difficult to address.

After reading the appeal, participants turned over the page and answered several questions. The first questions were similar to those asked in Experiments 1 and 2 regarding participants urge to help, the amount of money they would be willing to donate, and the extent to which they imagined themselves as both the donor and a victim. Then, they reported how easy it was to picture the situation described along a scale ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 10 (“very”).

Results

Perspective taking. The perspective manipulation was successful, as the first two sections of Table 2 show. Participants reported imagining themselves as the victim to a greater extent under victim-perspective conditions than under donor-perspective conditions (5.46 versus 2.08; $F(1, 44) = 24.28, p < .01$). Moreover, as Figure 3 shows, personalizing the appeal significantly increased participants’ tendency to imagine themselves as the victim when they were asked to take the victim’s perspective ($M_{diff} = 1.58$) but significantly decreased this tendency when they were asked to take the donor’s perspective ($M_{diff} = -1.99$). These differences confirm our expectations that personalization increases perspective conflict in the latter condition. However, although the effects of these variables on participants’ tendency to imagine themselves as the donor were similar, they were not reliable ($p > .10$). This again confirms our assumption that all participants imagined themselves as the donor at some point, regardless of whether they were asked to make a donation at the outset.

Desire to help. We hypothesized that personalizing the appeal would have a positive effect on participants’ willingness to help the victim when they read the appeal from the victim’s perspective but an adverse effect when they read the appeal from the donor’s perspective. The last two sections of Table 2 summarize data pertaining to this hypothesis. Figure 3 shows that when participants imagined them-

Table 2


EXPERIMENT 4: IMAGINED PERSPECTIVES AND DESIRE TO HELP AS A FUNCTION OF PARTICIPANTS’ PERSPECTIVE AND PERSONALIZATION OF THE APPEAL

	Personalized Appeal	Impersonal Appeal
<i>Tendency to Imagine Self as Victim</i>		
Victim perspective	6.25 _a	4.67 _b
Helper perspective	1.09 _c	3.08 _b
<i>Tendency to Imagine Self as Donor</i>		
Victim perspective	4.58	3.50
Helper perspective	5.18	5.69
<i>Urge to Help</i>		
Victim perspective	6.42 _a	4.58 _b
Helper perspective	4.73 _b	6.08 _{ab}
<i>Estimated Donation (\$)</i>		
Victim perspective	194 _a	86 _b
Helper perspective	113 _{ab}	86 _b

Notes: Cells with unlike subscripts differ at $p < .05$.

Figure 3

EXPERIMENT 4: EFFECTS OF PERSONALIZING THE APPEAL AS A FUNCTION OF INDUCED PERSPECTIVE



selves as the victim, personalizing the appeal increased both their urge to help ($M_{diff} = 1.84$) and the amount of money they estimated they would donate ($M_{diff} = \$108$). When participants imagined themselves as the donor, however, personalizing the appeal decreased their urge to help ($M_{diff} = -1.35$) and had little effect on donation estimates ($M_{diff} = \$27$). The interaction of perspective with personalism was significant in analyses of urge to help ($F(1, 44) = 7.80, p < .01$) but not in analyses of estimated donations ($p > .10$). Nevertheless, a multivariate analysis involving both dependent measures was reliable ($F(2, 43) = 3.81, p < .03$).

EXPERIMENT 5

The results of Experiment 4 provide further confirmation of our assumptions about the effect of perspective conflict on responses to a donation using a direct manipulation of the perspectives participants took at the time they read the appeal and a more direct measure of the personalism of the appeal. When participants were motivated a priori to take the victim's perspective, an appeal that was written from this perspective increased the tendency to imagine the situation from this perspective and increased the appeal's impact. When participants were asked to imagine the situation from the perspective of a donor, however, an appeal that was written from the victim's perspective created conflict, decreasing participants' tendency to imagine the situations from the latter perspective and decreasing the impact of the appeal.

Two possible restrictions on the generality of our findings remain. First, Experiments 1–4 were limited to a single content domain. Second, clear support for a perspective conflict interpretation of these results requires evidence that similar conflict would occur if the appeal focused on the donor but was read with the perspective of the potential victim. Experiment 5 provides this evidence. Participants read an appeal for organ donation that was written from either the perspective of the potential organ recipient or that of the potential donor. We expected the effects of personalizing a recipient-focused appeal to be similar to those observed in Experiment 4. In contrast, personalizing a donor-focused appeal should increase its impact when participants read it with the perspective of a potential donor but should decrease its impact when they read it from the perspective of an organ recipient.

Our manipulation of the appeal's focus and the recipient's perspective provides a further evaluation of the effect of persuasion knowledge (Friestad and Wright 1994). If inducing people to imagine themselves as a potential donor stimulates them to think of themselves as a target of persuasion and therefore induces resistance to persuasion, this should be as, or more, evident when the appeal is focused on the donor as when it is focused on the recipient. In other words, personalizing the appeal, and thus making it appear more heavy-handed, should have an adverse effect in both conditions. However, this was not the case.

Method

One hundred seventy-eight undergraduate students participated in this study. We assigned them to one of the eight conditions of a 2 (focus of appeal: donor-focused versus victim-focused) \times 2 (imagined perspective: organ donor versus organ recipient) \times 2 (appeal type: personalized versus impersonal) design.

Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to examine how students process information of the sort they encounter in daily life. On the cover page of the questionnaire, participants were told that they were going to view an announcement about organ donation from the Department of Health. They were told that while reading the announcement, they should imagine themselves as either (1) a person who might potentially donate an organ (an organ donor) or (2) someone in need of an organ (an organ recipient). The announcement provided information

about organ donations for either potential organ donors or organ recipients. The impersonal donor-focused appeal read as follows:

People are often not able to donate an organ unless they have died suddenly (e.g., in an accident or from an acute illness). Thus, even if they volunteer, they may not always be called upon to give. If they are eligible, the organs to be donated are removed surgically as soon as possible, with full respect to the deceased's body. Donation will not disfigure the body or change the way it looks. To be eligible, a volunteer should sign the organ donation card and inform his or her family. Without a signed organ donation card, the family of the deceased will not know their wishes.

The impersonal recipient-focused appeal read as follows:

People can suddenly incur a serious disease that requires many years of treatment. Imagine the experience they might have. They may undergo numerous operations and experience many days and hours of suffering, only to find that their only chance of recovery is an organ transplant. It is often difficult for them to find a donor, as donations of many organs (such as a cornea, heart, lung, or kidney) are very rare. If victims are fortunate enough to find a donor, however, they are often brought back to good health from the verge of death.

The personalized announcements were similar, except that references to people in general were replaced by references to "you" (e.g., "You might often not be able to donate an organ unless you have died suddenly"; "If you are eligible, the organs to be donated are removed surgically as soon as possible, with full respect to your body"; "People like yourself can suddenly incur a serious disease that requires many years of treatment"; and "If you are fortunate enough to find a donor, however, you may be brought back to good health from the verge of death").

After reading the announcement, participants indicated the extent to which they would personally sign an organ donation card distributed by the Department of Health. (Signing the organ donation card committed people to inform their family about their decision to donate organ after their death.) Then, they reported the extent to which they imagined themselves as the donor or recipient and, finally, their urge to help, using scales identical to those employed in the other experiments.

Results

Perspective taking. Participants reported a greater tendency to imagine themselves in the role of an organ recipient when they were explicitly asked to take the recipient's perspective than when they were asked to take a donor's perspective (5.75 versus 4.66; $F(1, 170) = 8.77, p < .01$). Correspondingly, they were more disposed to imagine themselves as the donor when they were asked to take the donor's perspective than when they were asked to take the recipient's perspective (5.23 versus 6.20; $F(1, 170) = 8.35, p < .01$).

Of greater importance is the three-way interaction of perspective, appeal focus, and personalism, which was significant in analyses of the tendency to imagine being both the victim ($F(1, 170) = 15.47, p < .01$) and the donor ($F(1,$

Table 3
EXPERIMENT 5: IMAGINED PERSPECTIVES AND DESIRE TO HELP AS A FUNCTION OF PARTICIPANT PERSPECTIVE,
ANNOUNCEMENT FOCUS, AND PERSONALIZATION OF THE APPEAL

	<i>Recipient-Focused Appeal</i>		<i>Donor-Focused Appeal</i>	
	<i>Personalized</i>	<i>Impersonal</i>	<i>Personalized</i>	<i>Impersonal</i>
<i>Tendency to Imagine Self as Recipient</i>				
Recipient perspective	7.80 _a	5.58 _b	4.87 _{bc}	4.75 _{bc}
Donor perspective	4.05 _c	5.60 _b	5.50 _b	3.52 _c
<i>Tendency to Imagine Self as Donor</i>				
Recipient perspective	5.15 _{bc}	5.95 _{ab}	4.13 _c	5.71 _{ab}
Donor perspective	6.21 _{ab}	6.15 _{ab}	7.08 _a	5.38 _{bc}
<i>Urge to Donate</i>				
Recipient perspective	6.85 _a	5.21 _b	4.48 _{bc}	6.08 _a
Donor perspective	3.95 _c	6.00 _{ab}	6.08 _a	4.93 _{bc}
<i>Willingness to Sign Donation Card</i>				
Recipient perspective	6.00	5.32	4.65	5.67
Donor perspective	4.68	5.60	5.50	4.96

Notes: Cells with unlike subscripts differ at $p < .05$.

170) = 3.25, $p < .07$). Data relevant to these interactions (see Table 3) are primarily attributable to the effects of personalizing the appeal on participants' tendency to imagine themselves as those on whom the appeal was focused. Figure 4 shows these effects pooled over donor-focused and recipient-focused appeals. When the focus of the appeal did not conflict with the perspective from which participants read it (i.e., when participants read either a recipient-focused appeal with the perspective of a recipient or a donor-focused appeal with the perspective of a donor), personalism increased their tendency to imagine themselves as the people on whom the appeal was focused (from 5.48 to 7.44; $M_{diff} = 1.96$). When the focus of the appeal conflicted with the perspective from which participants read it, however (i.e., participants read a recipient-focused appeal with a donor's perspective or a donor-focused appeal with a recipient's perspective), personalizing the appeal decreased the tendency to imagine themselves as the people on whom the appeal was focused (from 5.65 to 4.09; $M_{diff} = -1.57$). In contrast, participants' tendency to imagine themselves as the people on whom the appeal was not focused was not appreciably affected by perspective manipulations.

Desire to help. We expected that personalizing the appeal would increase participants' disposition to help when they read a donor-focused appeal from the perspective of the donor or a recipient-focused appeal from the perspective of the recipient. However, personalizing the appeal should decrease its impact when participants read it from a perspective that conflicted with the perspective from which the appeal was written.

The effects of these factors on participants' desire to help were consistent with our expectations. Analyses of urge to help (see Table 3) yielded a three-way interaction of perspective, appeal focus, and personalism ($F(1, 170) = 24.53$, $p < .01$). The impact of personalization under each perspective condition appears graphically in Figure 4. Personalizing the appeal increased participants' urge to help (from 5.07 to 6.46) when they took the perspective of the party on whom the appeal was focused (i.e., they either read a

donor-focused appeal from a donor's perspective or a recipient-focused appeal from a recipient's perspective) ($F(1, 169) = 9.51$, $p < .01$). However, personalizing the appeal decreased the urge to help (from 6.04 to 4.22) when participants were told to take a perspective of the party that differed from the one on whom the appeal was focused (i.e., they read either the donor-focused appeal from a recipient's perspective or the recipient-focused appeal from a donor's perspective) ($F(1, 169) = 15.23$, $p < .01$).

The effects of perspective and personalization on participants' willingness to sign a card agreeing to donate an organ were similar in direction (see Table 3). Again, the three-way interaction of perspective, appeal type, and personalism was significant ($F(1, 170) = 4.72$, $p < .05$). As Figure 4 shows, personalizing the appeal increased participants' willingness to sign the card (from 5.14 to 5.75, pooled over recipient-focused and donor-focused appeals) when their a priori perspective was the same as that of the appeal but decreased it (from 5.65 to 4.67) when the two perspectives differed. The three-way interaction of perspective, appeal type, and personalism was significant in a multivariate analysis involving both dependent variables ($F(2, 168) = 14.38$, $p < .003$).


GENERAL DISCUSSION

Implications for Marketing Strategy

Stimulating people to empathize with the victims of misfortune often increases their desire to help them. Substantial research supports this contention (see Batson et al. 1997). To this extent, persuasion techniques that increase empathy are likely to have a positive effect. As our findings indicate, however, additional considerations arise when aid is solicited in the context of a charitable appeal. Suppose that people encounter an appeal with the a priori expectation that they will be asked to make a donation. Then, characteristics of the appeal that encourage them to imagine the situation from the perspective of a potential beneficiary can be detrimental to its effectiveness. That is, they can

Figure 4

EXPERIMENT 5: EFFECTS OF PERSONALIZING THE APPEAL AS A FUNCTION OF THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS' IMAGINED PERSPECTIVE AND THE FOCUS OF THE APPEAL



decrease not only people's desire to make a donation but also the actual amount of money they are willing to give.

However, donations must be solicited at some point, and people must ultimately think of themselves as a donor for a solicitation to be effective. Moreover, people who receive a solicitation from a charitable organization are usually aware at some level that the organization wants them to make a contribution. If they are asked at the outset if they would be willing to help, this could further focus attention on themselves as a person who gives help and thus could increase the likelihood of doing so independently of other considera-

tions, as Langer and Abelson's (1972) research suggests (the differences in urge to help under no-picture conditions of Experiment 1 are also consistent with this possibility; see Table 1).

At the same time, if consumers are disposed to think of themselves as a potential donor at the time they read a charitable appeal, personalizing the appeal can be detrimental. In generalizing our findings to situations outside the laboratory, additional considerations arise. Recipients of a mail solicitation may often be unmotivated to think about the appeal extensively and might not do so at all unless features of the appeal capture their attention. Therefore, a picture of the victims in need or a personalized description of the situation they are facing may be more likely to capture attention than the request for money. To this extent, recipients may often consider the implications of this description before thinking of themselves as a potential donor even if they are aware of the appeal's objective. Nevertheless, it is worth speculating that when an appeal for money or other services is blatant and is conveyed explicitly in a way that stimulates recipient to adopt the donor's perspective at the outset, personalizing the appeal and presenting pictures of the victims can be detrimental to the appeal's effectiveness.

Theoretical Considerations

Our conceptualization of these results assumes that when people read a communication from two perspectives that are incompatible (e.g., the perspective of a victim of misfortune and that of a potential aid giver), they have difficulty processing the implications of the message, and this difficulty in processing leads the message to be less effective (Schwarz 2004). Supplementary data we obtained in Experiment 2 confirm this assumption.

We should also note certain ambiguities in our findings. First, although differences in perspective conflict had a consistent impact on participants' reported urge to help and, in Experiment 3, the actual amount of money they donated, the effect of these differences on participants' estimates of how much they would donate in a hypothetical situation was much less evident. As we noted previously, this could be traceable in part to social desirability concerns that did not come into play when participants made actual donation decisions. It might also have resulted from a procedural artifact. That is, participants in our experiments were told to assume that they had HK\$500 (approximately US\$65) in their pocket, which is a large sum for college students to carry around. As a result, some participants may have inflated their estimate of the amount they would donate to conform to the implicit expectation that they would donate a lot, whereas others were guided by the amount they would be likely to give in a more realistic situation. These differences may have created variance that prevented differences in donation estimates from being detected.

A second ambiguity has implications for our interpretation of the effect of personalizing an appeal in the absence of explicit instructions to take the perspective of the people on whom the appeal is focused. Although presenting a picture of the victim in Experiments 1–3 increased participants' tendency to imagine themselves as the victim, this tendency in the absence of a picture was consistently less when participants were not asked for help at the outset than when they were. This difference, which was evident in all

three experiments, indicates that in the absence of a picture calling attention to the victim, participants may not have spontaneously imagined the situation from the victim's perspective. Rather, they may have read the appeal without taking any perspective at all. Thus, presenting a picture of the victim may have been necessary to stimulate participants to take this perspective. Somewhat ironically, asking participants at the outset if they would help may also provide this stimulation, as well as induce them to consider themselves potential donors, thus producing the conflict that decreased the appeal's effectiveness. This possibility does not compromise our conceptualization of the effect of perspective conflict that occurred under request-first conditions. However, it suggests that personalizing the appeal alone in the absence of additional stimulation was not sufficient to influence participants to take the victim's perspective.

Alternative Interpretations

Our findings also call into question alternative interpretations of our results. For example, inducing participants to take the perspective of a potential donor could lead them to think of themselves as a target of persuasion, activating persuasion knowledge that leads them to resist being influenced. This resistance might be greater when the appeal is personalized or in other ways appears heavy-handed. However, Experiment 2 provided no evidence that participants were under greater pressure in these conditions. Furthermore, when participants in Experiment 5 were told to take the perspective of the donor, personalizing a donor-focused appeal, which should be perceived as particularly heavy-handed, increased their willingness to help rather than decreased it.

More generally, prior research on the factors that influence donations has assumed that donations are influenced by identification with the people in need or by feelings of sympathy and empathy for these people (Batson et al. 1997; Cialdini et al. 1997). Although these factors undoubtedly play a role in donations, there was no evidence that they contributed to the phenomena we reported herein. Rather, the results we observed were apparently mediated by cognitive responses to the appeal rather than by motivational factors. In this regard, note that presenting a picture of the victim increased participants' willingness to help in the request-after conditions of Experiments 1–3, even though they were Hong Kong Chinese and the pictured victim was African. This reinforces our conclusion that identification with the victim did not exert much influence in our studies. Nevertheless, it seems likely that if the cause of the victim's misfortune was one that participants could not possibly imagine themselves experiencing (e.g., if the victim's misfortune was the result of a uniquely feminine disease and the potential donors were male), empathy and identification might play a greater role, and the effects of perspective that we observed might be diminished. A conceptualization that brings together both cognitive and motivational determinants of solicitation effectiveness and articulates their relative contributions awaits development.

Our findings are worth noting in the context of other research on the impact of role taking on behavioral decisions and information processing in general. As we noted previously, Green and Brock (see also Escalas 2004) find

that persuasive messages have a greater effect when they take the form of a narrative and recipients become "transported" into the situation described. Conveying information in the form of a narrative may be yet another way to induce participants to take the perspective of the people to whom a communication pertains, and its effect might be similar to that of the variables we considered in our studies. In this regard, Adaval and colleagues (Adaval, Isbell, and Wyer 2007; Adaval and Wyer 1998) show that accompanying text information with pictures can increase its effect when the text is in the form of a narrative but decreases its effect when the same information is conveyed in an ostensibly unordered list. These results indicate that if charity appeals are in the form of a narrative, recipients may find it easier to take the perspective of the people in need, and pictures may enhance the effect. This possibility may be worth examining.

REFERENCES

- Adaval, Rashmi, Linda M. Isbell, and Robert S. Wyer Jr. (2007), "The Impact of Pictures on Narrative- and List-Based Impression Formation: A Process Interference Model," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 43 (May), 352–64.
- and Robert S. Wyer Jr. (1998), "The Role of Narratives in Consumer Information Processing," *Journal of Consumer Psychology*, 7 (3), 207–245.
- Aron, Arthur and Elaine N. Aron (1986), *Love and the Expansion of Self: Understanding Attraction and Satisfaction*. New York: Hemisphere/Harper & Row.
- , ———, and Danny Smollan (1992), "Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the Structure of Interpersonal Closeness," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 63 (4), 596–612.
- Bagozzi, Richard P. and David J. Moore (1994), "Public Service Advertisements: Emotions and Empathy Guide Prosocial Behavior," *Journal of Marketing*, 58 (January), 56–70.
- Baron, Reuben M. and David A. Kenny (1986), "The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51 (6), 1173–82.
- Batson, Daniel C., Shannon Early, and Giovanni Salvarani (1997), "Perspective Taking: Imagining How Another Feels Versus Imagining How You Would Feel," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23 (7), 751–58.
- , Karen Sager, Eric Garst, Misook Kang, Kostic Rubchinsky, and Karen Dawson (1997), "Is Empathy-Induced Helping Due to Self-Other Merging?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73 (3), 495–509.
- and Laura L. Shaw (1991), "Encouraging Words Concerning the Evidence for Altruism," *Psychological Inquiry*, 2 (2), 159–68.
- Brehm, Jack W. (1966), *A Theory of Psychological Reactance*. New York: Academic Press.
- Campbell, Margaret C. and Amna Kirmani (2008), "I Know What You're Doing and Why You're Doing It: The Use of the Persuasion Knowledge Model in Consumer Research," in *The Handbook of Consumer Psychology*, Curtis Haugtvedt, Paul M. Herr, and Frank R. Kardes, eds. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 549–71.
- Cialdini, Robert B., Stephanie L. Brown, Brian P. Lewis, Carol Luce, and Steven L. Neuberg (1997), "Reinterpreting the Empathy-Altruism Relationship: When One into One Equals Oneness," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73 (3), 481–94.
- , Mark Schaller, Donald Houlihan, Kevin Arps, Jim Fultz, and Arthur L. Beaman (1987), "Empathy-Based Helping: Is It

- Selflessly or Selfishly Motivated?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52 (4), 749–58.
- Cunningham, Michael R., Jeff Steinberg, and Rita Grev (1980), "Wanting to and Having to Help: Separate Motivations for Positive Mood and Guilt-Induced Helping," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 38 (2), 181–92.
- Darley, John M. and Bibb Latane (1968), "Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 8 (4), 377–83.
- Emmons, Robert A. and Michael E. McCullough (2004), *The Psychology of Gratitude*, Vol. 14. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Escalas, Jennifer E. (2004), "Imagine Yourself in the Product: Mental Simulation, Narrative Transportation, and Persuasion," *Journal of Advertising*, 33 (2), 37–48.
- (2007), "Self-Referencing and Persuasion: Narrative Transportation Versus Analytical Elaboration," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 33 (March), 421–29.
- and Barbara B. Stern (2003), "Sympathy and Empathy: Emotional Responses to Advertising Dramas," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 29 (March), 566–78.
- Friestad, Marian and Peter Wright (1994), "The Persuasion Knowledge Model: How People Cope with Persuasion Attempts," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 21 (June), 1–31.
- Green, Melanie C. and Timothy C. Brock (2000), "The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public Narratives," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79 (5), 701–721.
- Hornstein, Harvey A. (1982), "Promotive Tension: Theory and Research," in *Cooperation and Helping Behavior: Theories and Research*, Valerian J. Derlega and Janusz Grzelak, eds. New York: Academic Press, 229–48.
- Langer, Ellen J. and Robert P. Abelson (1972), "The Semantics of Asking a Favor: How to Succeed in Getting Help Without Really Dying," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 24 (1), 26–32.
- Lerner, Melvin J. and Carolyn H. Simmons (1966), "Observer's Reaction to the 'Innocent Victim': Compassion or Rejection?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 4 (2), 203–210.
- Menon, Geeta and Priya Raghuram (2003), "Ease of Retrieval as an Automatic Input in Judgments: A Mere-Accessibility Framework?" *Journal of Consumer Research*, 30 (September), 230–43.
- Miller, Dale T. (1977), "Altruism and Threat to a Belief in a Just World," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 13 (2), 113–24.
- Novemsky, Nathan, Ravi Dhar, Norbert Schwarz, and Itamar Simonson (2007), "Preference Fluency in Consumer Choice," *Journal of Marketing Research*, 44 (August), 347–56.
- Petrova, Petia K. and Robert B. Cialdini (2005), "Fluency of Consumption Imagery and the Backfire Effects of Imagery Appeals," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 32 (December), 442–52.
- Schwartz, Barry (1967), "The Social Psychology of the Gift," *American Journal of Sociology*, 73, (July), 1–11.
- Schwarz, Norbert (2004), "Metacognitive Experiences in Consumer Judgment and Decision Making," *Journal of Consumer Psychology*, 14 (4), 332–48.
- Sherman, Steven, Robert B. Cialdini, Donna F. Schwartzman, and Kim D. Reynolds (1985), "Imagining Can Heighten or Lower Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 11 (1), 118–27.
- Smith, Kyle D., John P. Keating, and Ezra Stotland (1989), "Altruism Reconsidered: The Effect of Denying Feedback on a Victim's Status to Empathic Witnesses," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57 (4), 641–50.
- Wänke, Michaela, Herbert Bless, and Barbara Biller (1996), "Subjective Experience Versus Content of Information in the Construction of Attitude Judgments," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 22 (11), 1105–113.
- Winkielman, Piotr and John T. Cacioppo (2001), "Mind at Ease Puts a Smile on the Face: Psychophysiological Evidence that Processing Facilitation Elicits Positive Affect," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81 (6), 989–1000.
- , Jamin Halberstadt, Tedra Fazendeiro, and Steve Catty (2006), "Prototypes Are Attractive Because They Are Easy on the Mind," *Psychological Science*, 17 (9), 799–806.
- Wyer, Robert S., Rashmi Adaval, and Stanley J. Colcombe (2002), "Narrative-Based Representations of Social Knowledge: Their Construction and Use in Comprehension, Memory and Judgment," in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 35, Mark P. Zanna, ed. San Diego: Academic Press, 133–97.

Copyright of *Journal of Marketing Research* (JMR) is the property of American Marketing Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.