

Choice set induced conflict, deliberation, and persistent preference

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Abstract This research examines the roles of both approach–avoidance and approach–approach conflicts in the relationship between the degree of deliberation and persistence of preference for the chosen option. In three experiments, we reverse the negative effect of deliberation on persistence reported by Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009). In study 1A, we conceptually replicate Nordgren and Dijksterhuis’s results in a choice context with simultaneous presentation of options. In study 1B, we reversed this effect by making minor alterations to the choice set. When the choice set contains a brand with advantage on an irrelevant attribute with conflict caused by the more important attributes remains unchanged, deliberation leads to greater preference stability. In study 2, we obtain process evidence for a reduction in conflict and dominance structuring caused by discrimination in terms of an irrelevant attribute. In study 3, we found that when choice set induces conflict between two attractive options, deliberation causes persistent preference. In study 4, we vary perceived conflict without varying the choice set and replicate the effects obtained in experiments 1A and 1B. Thus, our studies provide evidence for the roles of approach–avoidance and approach–approach conflicts (Coombs and Avrunin 1988) in the deliberation–persistence relationship.

Keywords Preference persistence · Approach–avoidance conflict · Approach–approach conflict · Deliberation

1 Introduction

An important marketing objective by which a firm obtains sustainable competitive advantage is to create and sustain loyalty for the firm’s brands among the customers.

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Among other contents, loyalty includes persistent preference for the chosen brand. Creating persistent preferences for the firm's brand among a large segment of consumers and persuading consumers against developing this tendency for the competitor brands are critical to any firm. Therefore, an understanding of why and how consumers persist with their choices and evaluations is an important research theme that has definite implications for marketers.

There are a number of other factors that influence the strength of preference for a previously chosen option. In the current research, we examine the role of deliberation in creating persistent preferences for the chosen options. More specifically, we examine the role of degree of conflict created by choice sets that affect the relationship between deliberation and persistent preference.

1.1 Deliberation and persistence

Research on attitudes, especially from the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) tradition, has considered several dimensions of attitude strength such as confidence (Tormala and Petty 2004) and the amount of relevant and attitude-consistent information available (Wood 1982) as the causes of attitudinal persistence and resistance to counterattitudinal information. An antecedent that leads to several strength dimensions of an evaluation is the degree of elaboration or deliberation of the product attributes and benefits.

Research offers conflicting evidence as to the strength of a preference caused by the amount of deliberation. The ELM predicts that a more thoughtful attitude possesses strength in terms of confidence, stability, and resistance to counterpersuasion (Petty, Haugtvedt, and Smith 1995). On the other hand, attitude researchers (Wilson et al. 1989; Wilson and Schooler 1991) as well as decision researchers (Nordgren and Dijksterhuis 2009) have found that actual deliberation led to less stable attitudes or preferences.

The thesis of Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) was that unconscious thought may yield more accurate choices than conscious thought in complex decisions. Here, accuracy was defined as choosing the option that has more positive attributes than the other options. However, (Payne, Samper, Bettman, and Luce 2008) reported that this effect does not hold when the deliberation was not constrained artificially (as in the studies by Dijksterhuis and his colleagues). Further, the effect did not hold in the choice environments in which the options vary not just in terms of the number of positive attributes but also in terms of the magnitudes of attributes so that the option with the highest expected value would be considered the best option.

Apart from affecting accuracy, deliberation may also influence the degree of persistence. Wilson et al. (1989) argued that when people deliberate, they focus on attributes of the attitude object that are accessible in memory and are often easy to verbalize. But people's "true" attitudes might have been formed based on attributes that are either difficult to access or difficult to verbalize or both. Deliberation causes people to access attributes that are often not the actual causes of their attitudes. This explains why people who deliberate exhibit lesser stability in their attitudes and preferences (Wilson and Schooler 1991).

In several experiments, Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009) found evidence for their hypothesis that a deliberative processing style actively hinders preference consistency.

They found that when six hypothetical apartments were described in terms of nine attributes in such a way that neither apartment dominates others, greater deliberation led to weaker preferences. In our research, we examine the characteristics pertaining to the choice set that causes a *reversal* of this effect.

1.2 The role of choice conflict in the deliberation–persistence relationship

The finding of Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009) that greater deliberation leads to inconsistent preferences is quite provocative. Specifically, the authors suggested that deliberation leads to inconsistent weighting of attributes/information and thus hinders preference consistency. This sounds very much plausible in the case where consumers are evaluating new products, the weights of different attributes, and the desirability of attribute values for which they are uncertain about. We believe that the degree of perceived conflict in the decision context will cause this effect to reverse.

In the behavioral decision theory literature, conflicts of different types have been proposed. When options contain unique good features, consumers may face approach–approach conflict, and when the options possess unique bad features, consumers may experience avoidance–avoidance conflict (Houston, Sherman, and Baker 1991). It is reasonable to expect choices to be more persistent under approach–approach conflict than under avoidance–avoidance conflict. Nagpal et al. (2011) found that some of the consequences of conflict, such as delaying the decision, can be reduced by providing information on additional attributes even if the options may not vary in terms of these additional attributes.

In the present research, we consider a third type of conflict. High conflict of this nature occurs when each option in the choice set possesses both advantages and disadvantages in terms of a set of important attributes, and consumers are expected to make difficult trade-offs. Coombs and Avrunin (1977) classify such conflicts as *approach–avoidance* conflicts. In such a context, deliberation causes consumers to think of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the chosen option. As the deliberation causes uncertainty in weights to become salient, only weak preferences are formed. What will happen when the trade-off difficulty is reduced by some irrelevant discrimination? In this instance, consumers judge the option that this discrimination favors as slightly more attractive. Deliberation after this initial impression helps consumers in their “dominance structuring” in which they bolster the advantages and deemphasize the disadvantages of the chosen option by subjectively altering the attribute weights or the values (Montgomery 1983; Montgomery and Willen 1999). In addition, when there is an initial positive anchor, deliberation can help polarize overall evaluations (Tesser and Leone 1977). Thus, deliberation in this situation can lead to stronger preferences. Experiment 1 tests this proposition. In this and subsequent experiments, we identify situations that will reverse the Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009) effects and offer an initial test of the underlying process.

2 Experiment 1A

The objective of this experiment was to replicate the effects reported by Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009) under high approach–avoidance conflict.

2.1 Product category

We used MP4 players as the product category for this experiment as our participants have very high level of familiarity with this category. Based on our judgment as well as expert opinion, we narrowed down the number of nonprice attributes to six. In a pretest ($N=40$), we first asked subjects to rate the importance of several attributes. As memory was considered to be the most important attribute, we did not vary the levels of memory across the brands. We then asked subjects to consider the ranges of values for five other attributes and then rate the importance of each of these advantages on a scale of 1 (not at all important) to 9 (extremely important). The ranges for the attributes of screen size, battery life for video (hours), warranty, and music playing time (hours) were exactly the same as the ones used for the two brands in the main experiment. For example, the range of the attribute of warranty was 12 to 18 months (see appendix A), and subjects were asked, “For you, how important is an improvement in warranty period for an MP4 player from 12 months to 18 months?” In addition, we also asked them to consider a reduction in weight of the player from 220 to 200 g and judge the importance of this change. The mean importance ratings were 6.2, 5.8, 5.7, 5.4, and 1.8 for the attributes of warranty, screen size, battery life for videos, music playing time, and weight of the player, respectively. Based on these results, we constructed our choice set so that a player that had advantages in terms of warranty and music playing time had disadvantages in terms of screen size and battery life for videos.

2.2 Method

One hundred and nineteen participants were assigned to one of two experimental conditions. Manipulation pertained to deliberation. Deliberation was manipulated in the same manner as in Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009). Participants in the high deliberation condition were told that “New research has shown that people can make more accurate product evaluations and choices if they make deliberate decisions. So, please think carefully, consider all the reasons for and against the options, and then make your choice.” Participants in the low deliberation condition were told that “New research findings suggest that people’s choices are more accurate when they are based on a quick, first impression. So proceed with the choice task immediately.” Of the two MP4 players presented to participants, one was better than the other in terms of the attributes of warranty and music playing time but worse in terms of battery life for videos and screen size and vice versa (see appendix A). The two brands did not vary on a fifth attribute—weight (200 g). Brand labels (J and P) and attribute values were counterbalanced. Participants made choices between these two brands (time 1 choice). Immediately after the choice task, we obtained measures on choice satisfaction, confidence in choice, and perceived deliberation on scales of 1 to 9. Sixty minutes later (during which time they performed several tasks unrelated to this experiment), participants were told that a new brand R has been introduced in the market. Participants received information about the new brand R that was not dominated by either J or P, the previously chosen brands. Participants were asked to imagine that they gifted their first MP4 player to a friend and they needed to buy another one for themselves. They were asked to choose between the brand they chose earlier and the new brand (time 2 choice). Participants were given information about the previously

chosen brand as well as the new brand. If at time 2, a participant chose the same brand that she chose at time 1, her choice was coded as 1 (persistent preference), or else the choice was coded as zero (no persistence). Proportion of subjects that exhibited persistent preference in each condition constituted the key dependent variable.

2.3 Results

There was no difference between the two conditions in terms of the time 1 choices. While 35 out of 61 (57.4 %) subjects chose brand J in the low deliberation condition, the corresponding proportion in the high deliberation condition was 31 out of 58 (53.5 %; *Wald chi-square* <1).

Not surprisingly, our deliberation manipulation had a significant effect on perceived deliberation ($M_{low}=5.02$ and $M_{high}=5.84$; $F(1,117)=8.82$, $p<0.01$). As expected, deliberation weakened confidence ($M_{low}=5.57$ and $M_{high}=5.02$; $F(1,117)=4.49$, $p<0.04$) and satisfaction ($M_{low}=5.52$ and $M_{high}=5.04$; $F(1,117)=4.61$, $p<0.04$). Choice persistence at time 2 followed the same pattern as choice confidence and satisfaction. Deliberation caused reduced persistence (*Wald*=2.91, $p<0.09$). Persistence rate was 26/61 (42.6 %) in the low deliberation condition and 16/58 (27.6 %) in the high deliberation condition.

2.4 Discussion

In this experiment, we conceptually replicate the effect reported by Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009). While in their study, preference consistency was measured as the stability of evaluation in two time periods for the same object, in our research, preference consistency refers to the tendency to stay with the same choice when an equally good option is available. While Nordgren and Dijksterhuis have considered complexity (number of options or number of attributes to be evaluated) as a moderator of this effect, we propose that the extent and type of conflict produced by the choice set may act as a moderator. In other words, their focus is on task variables, we focus on the context or choice set characteristics (Payne 1982). In the following experiments, we alter the characteristics of the options presented in the choice set in order to vary the degree and type of potential conflict.

3 Experiment 1B

In this experiment, we intend to alter the choice set so that participants perceive lower conflict in choice. Recall that in experiment 1A, the conflict in choice originated from the trade-off involved in choice between the two sets of important attributes—warranty and music playing time versus battery life for videos and screen size. In the current experiment, we intend to retain the approach–avoidance conflict but vary the value of the fifth attribute of weight of the player. As the difference between 220 and 200 g was judged to be highly irrelevant, objectively there should be no change in participants' preferences. On the more important attributes of warranty, battery life for videos, screen size, and music playing time, the level of potential conflict in choice is no less than that in experiment 1A. Nonetheless, as the discrimination is diagnostic (Feldman and Lynch

1988), and the first impression favors one brand over the other, dominance structuring is easier in this context in which the brands differ in terms of the fifth attribute. In addition, many consumers may consider this fifth attribute as a tie breaker. Thus, although the level of conflict is not reduced objectively, consumers may perceive reduced conflict due to this trivial difference. What is more important is the effect of deliberation on preference persistence in this context. As consumers tentatively identify an advantage of the focal option, greater deliberation will focus on additional advantages of this option and will cause polarization of the evaluation (Tesser and Leone 1977). Therefore, we predict greater persistence in the high deliberation condition, reversing the Nordgren and Dijksterhuis effect.

Except from the fact that there was a difference between the brands in terms of the fifth attribute of weight (200 versus 220 g), the stimuli as well as the procedure were exactly the same as in experiment 1A. We found that the results of experiment 1A with respect to preference persistence as well as the other dependent variables of confidence and choice satisfaction were completely reversed.

Unlike in experiment 1A, in the present experiment, deliberation influenced even the time 1 choice. While 34 out of 58 (58.6 %) in the low deliberation condition chose the lighter weight MP4 player at time 1, this proportion was much higher in the high deliberation condition (44 out of 59 (74.6 %); $Wald=3.37, p<0.07$). As we reasoned, when dominance structuring is easier, deliberation causes greater preference for the focal option. In addition, deliberation enhances rather than reduces preference consistency. The persistence rates were 29 out of 58 (50 %) and 39 out of 59 (66.1 %) in the low and high deliberation conditions, respectively ($Wald=3.08, p<0.08$). Confidence in choice ($M_{low}=5.72$ and $M_{high}=6.37$; $F(1,115)=6.07, p<0.02$), and choice satisfaction ($M_{low}=5.70$ and $M_{high}=6.22$; $F(1,115)=3.69, p<0.06$) were in the predicted directions.

If our reasoning that deliberation in this context helps to reduce the conflict and causes the trivial advantage of the chosen brand to be outweighed is correct, we should obtain a choice at time 1 \times deliberation interaction. Specifically, persistence should be greater for those who chose the player weighing 200 g under high deliberation condition. Indeed, this is what our results showed. Under low deliberation, there was no difference between the two brands chosen at time 1 in terms of persistence. The persistent rate was 16/34 (47.1 %) for the 200 g player and was 13/24 (54.2 %) for the 220 g player. However, under high deliberation, the corresponding rates were 33/44 (77.2 %) and 6/15 (40 %). The interaction between choice at time 1 and deliberation was significant ($Wald=4.67, p<0.04$). Follow-up tests revealed that the difference in persistence between the two brands was nonsignificant ($Wald<1$) in the low deliberation condition but was significant in the high deliberation condition ($Wald=5.67, p<0.02$).

Note that the advantage of the focal option was trivial, and the conflict in terms of the more important attributes still existed. However, deliberation causes consumers to give the trivial advantage unduly greater weight in choices and thereby perceive lesser conflict than what objectively exists. It should be noted that the task variable of number of attributes of the competing options proposed as the moderator of the deliberation effect by Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009) caused only a dilution of the effect. That is, while deliberation caused lesser consistency when the options were described in terms of six attributes, there was no difference between deliberation and no deliberation conditions when the apartments were described in terms of three attributes. In our

experiment, however, the characteristics of choice sets, which serve as the choice context, *reversed* the effect reported by Nordgren and Dijksterhuis.

It is noteworthy that even a trivial difference reversed the effect of deliberation on persistence. We would expect that greater deliberation should reveal the triviality of discrimination and the advantage based on this difference and should cause greater brand switching. However, we found that deliberation accentuated persistence. The finding that trivial difference will cause a positive relationship between deliberation and persistence will be useful to marketers (and harmful from consumer welfare perspective). It is easy to discriminate on irrelevant attributes (Carpenter et al. 1994). If marketers could offer facilitating conditions for deliberation, this will result in inappropriate preference persistence. In experiment 2 reported below, we obtained additional evidence for the process proposed.

4 Experiment 2

In this experiment ($N=48$), we retained only the high deliberation condition and varied conflict within this condition. That is, one group of participants (high conflict) saw choice set the same as in experiment 1A while others (low conflict) saw choice set the same as in experiment 1B. The remainder of the procedure was the same as in experiments 1A and 1B with the following exceptions. A couple of minutes after participants made their choice at time 1 and after the information sheets and the choice records were collected, participants were asked to list the characteristics of the chosen brand. Two coders blind to the experiment classified participants' responses first as comparative or noncomparative and then as positive, negative, or neutral. As expected, in both conditions, more than 70 % of the statements (74 % in the high conflict and 71 % in the low conflict conditions; $Wald < 1$) were comparative in nature (e.g., "Brand J had a bigger screen"). While the two conditions did not differ in terms of total statements for the chosen brand (3.00 in the high conflict vs. 2.67 in the low conflict condition; $F(1, 46) = 1.56, p > 0.2$), the low conflict condition produced more favorable statements for the chosen brand (1.96) than did the high conflict condition (1.45; $F(1, 46) = 10.6, p < 0.01$).

Choice at time 2 was in the predicted direction. Specifically, persistence (choice of the same brand at time 1 and time 2) was greater in the low conflict condition (14/24; 58.3 %) than in the high conflict condition (8/24; 33.3 %; $Wald = 2.95, p < 0.09$). We obtained additional evidence for our assertion that when conflict is reduced even via trivial differences, deliberation facilitates dominance structuring and thereby preference persistence and thus reverses the effect reported by Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009). Experiment 3 identifies another context in which deliberation promotes preference persistence.

5 Experiment 3

In experiments 1 and 2, we proposed conflict as the moderator of the effect of deliberation on persistence. Specifically, when choice sets induce high conflict, greater deliberation leads to lesser persistence. Conflict considered in experiments 1 and 2 is of

the approach–avoidance nature as either of the two options had both favorable and unfavorable aspects (Coombs and Avrunin 1977). In experiment 3, we consider conflicts of the approach–approach nature. Specifically, we examine situations in which the competing brands possess sets of nonoverlapping (non-comparable) attributes. Because the two sets of attributes each offer only positive benefits, and side-by-side comparison creates difficulty in choice, an *approach–approach* conflict is induced (Coombs and Avrunin 1988). We propose that in these contexts, deliberation will lead consumers to think more about the positive aspects of the chosen brand and hence greater persistence.

One hundred and sixty-two female participants participated in this experiment. The only factor in the experiment was deliberation, manipulated in exactly the same manner as in experiments 1 and 2. The initial choice set consisted of two competing brands of skin lotions made from natural ingredients. The key ingredients of the two lotions were non-comparable (for example, cocoa butter vs. jojoba extracts). The brand names and ingredients were counterbalanced. Ninety minutes after the initial choice (time 2), participants made a choice between the previously chosen brand and a new brand. This new brand varied according to participants' initial choice. In either case, the new brand was portrayed as better in terms of two attributes and worse in terms of two other attributes than the previously chosen brand.

Participants' initial choices did not vary as a function of deliberation. The choice share of the brands with set 1 attributes was 53.7 % (44/82) in the low deliberation condition and 56.3 % (45/80) in the high deliberation condition ($Wald < 1$). The persistence after 90 min were 43.9 % (36/82) and 60.0 % (48/80) in the no deliberation and deliberation conditions respectively ($Wald = 4.17, p < 0.05$). There was no interaction between deliberation and time 1 preferences to affect persistence. Thus, when choice sets induce approach–approach conflict, it appears that greater deliberation has a favorable effect on persistence. We propose that deliberation causes people to think more about the advantage of the focal option over the competing option. Thus, these results identify another choice context that can *reverse* the effects found by Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009).

6 Experiment 4

In the previous three experiments, conflict was varied in terms of the characteristics of the choice set. In the present choice set we control for the nature of the choice set but induce perceived conflict by using a well-established misattribution procedure (Lieberman and Forster 2006). This procedure manipulates potential to misattribute the difficulty in decision to an external source. For example, in one of Lieberman and Forster's (2006) studies, the room in which subjects participated in the experiment was filled with a pleasant orange aroma. One-half of the subjects were told that according to the aroma therapy, the orange aroma in the room would make the decision between the two options easy; the other half were told that the orange aroma would make the decision difficult. Both groups were asked to choose between two options, and the task constituted a difficult choice. The authors found that compared to the group that perceived difficulty solely due to the choice set characteristics, the subjects who had reasons to attribute the difficulty to an external source (aroma) are more likely to persist with a previously chosen option. We argue that deliberation can accentuate subjects'

choices in either direction. That is, if there is an external source to attribute choice difficulty, greater deliberation should cause greater persistence. On the other hand, if subjects perceive that the difficulty in choice is solely due to the characteristics of the choice set, greater deliberation should cause lesser persistence. Experiment 4 tested these predictions.

6.1 Method

In this experiment we used a very similar choice set as the one used in experiment 1A (difficult choice that can lead to high degree of approach–avoidance conflict). We employed a 2 (attribution of difficulty—external vs. choice set) \times 2 (deliberation—high vs. low) between-subjects design. One hundred and sixty subjects participated for course credits. Subjects in all conditions first saw a pleasant picture of mountain, lake, and trees. Subjects in the external attribution condition were told that prior psychological research has shown that feelings due to pleasant pictures would cause choices between options difficult. Subjects in the choice set conditions were told that feelings due to pleasant pictures would cause choices between options easy. In addition, deliberation was manipulated as in experiment 1A. The subsequent experimental tasks were similar to those in experiment 1A.

6.2 Results and discussion

Our manipulations did not affect time 1 choices. As predicted, there was an attribution \times deliberation interaction ($Wald=5.97, p<0.02$) on persistence. Further, deliberation increased persistence in the external attribution condition (26/39 or 66.7 % under low deliberation and 35/42 or 83.3 % under high deliberation; $Wald=2.93, p<0.09$) but decreased persistence in the no external attribution condition (19/40 or 47.5 % under low deliberation and 11/39 or 28.2 % under high deliberation; $Wald=3.07, p<0.08$). Thus, we obtained additional evidence for our assertion that the deliberation effect can go either way. It should be noted that while the level of difficulty and the degree of conflict are objectively the same across the two conditions, subjects' perceived differential conflict, and these differential perceptions, interacted with the degree of deliberation to affect the level of persistence.

7 General discussion and conclusion

The results from four experiments are summarized in Table 1. We demonstrate that when a choice set portrays a minor advantage to one option over all others in the choice set on a commensurable attribute, the content of people's deliberation is more positive even though in an objective sense choice conflict induced by other attributes is not reduced in any manner. It is reasonable to expect that actual deliberation was highly correlated with perceived deliberation in Wilson's paradigm of research and in the Nordgren and Dijksterhuis studies. Most of these studies, however, presented information about one object only; in studies in which multiple objects were presented, consumers received information about each object separately or experienced the objects sequentially (as in Nordgren and Dijksterhuis's study 3). When information about

Table 1 Likelihood of persistence in each condition

Experiment	Level and type of choice conflict	Deliberation	Persistence likelihood
1A	High (approach–avoidance)	Low	0.43
		High	0.28
1B	Low (trivial differentiation)	Low	0.50
		High	0.66
2	Low (trivial differentiation)	High	0.58
	High (approach–avoidance)	High	0.33
3	High (approach–approach)	Low	0.44
		High	0.60
4	High (no external attribution)	Low	0.48
		High	0.28
	Low (external attribution)	Low	0.67
		High	0.83

several dimensions is presented in this manner, deliberation might involve only those attributes that are easily accessible and easy to verbalize. On the other hand, when information about several options is presented side-by-side (as in a typical choice task), deliberation may involve comparisons, and the focus may be on attributes that discriminate the options and are thus diagnostic (Feldman and Lynch 1988). Once the focus is on the advantage of an option, deliberation helps dominance structuring activities such as bolstering the focal brand's advantages and thereby enhances persistence. When the choice set involves heavy trade-offs with no irrelevant differentiation as in experiment 1A, the focus will be on both advantages and disadvantages of the option. In this context, greater deliberation may cause consumer to think about both advantages and disadvantages, and it is likely that the disadvantages receive greater weight and hence lead to switching away from the option. However, with an advantage in terms, even an unimportant attribute causes deliberation to focus on the positive aspects. Thus, as we found, choice sets play an important role in determining whether the effect of deliberation is harmful or helpful for preference strength, and this finding has important implication for managers. They could highlight their brands' advantage in terms of even unimportant attributes in situations that cause consumers to deliberate more.

In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the strength and stability of constructed preferences (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 2008; Simonson 2008). Our findings offer additional evidence to the notion that constructed preferences can be stable. In addition, we identify the conditions under which constructed preferences acquire stability. Specifically, when people are asked to deliberate before making their decisions, the degree of persistence depends on the degree of conflict induced by the choice sets. Thus, our research adds on to the growing literature on the effects of choice sets on constructed preferences (Muthukrishnan and Wathieu 2007; Yoon and Simonson 2008). Future research may examine several situational and individual factors that moderate the effect of perceived deliberation on preference persistence.

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Appendix A

Choice set in Exp 1A (time 1 choice)

Table 2 You are about to buy an MP4 player. After some information gathering, you narrow down your choices to one of the following brands

Brand	Memory (GB)	Screen size (inch)	Warranty (months)	Battery life for video (hours)	Music playing time (hours)	Weight (grams)	Price (XX \$)
J	4.0	2.8	12	6	24	200	450
P	4.0	2.2	18	4	28	200	450

Please check one of the boxes to indicate your choice:

J

P

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