

## Extra-role behaviors among temporary workers: how firms create relational wealth in the United States of America

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We examine temporary workers' differential extra-role behaviors (ERBs) towards their client and employer; if this varied with the motivation of the worker for being temporary, whether these ERBs are affected by firms' relationship management practices; and whether the ERBs aimed at the client and the employer impact subsequent outcomes. Results showed that temporary workers' motivations are differentially related to agency and client directed ERBs. Agency ERBs were related to longer tenure with the agency, while client ERBs were associated with faster wage growth and more hours worked per week. Organizational relationship management practices elicit different client and agency directed ERBs.

**Keywords:** client organization; extra role behaviors; temporary help agency; temporary workers

Workers with non-standard contracts form a significant part of the workforce in countries around the world (de Jong, Schalk, and Goessling 2007). This has led to a renewed interest by researchers in non-standard work arrangements and their correlates (Connelly and Gallagher 2004; Ashford, George and Blatt 2007). Two very broad themes emerge from this body of work: that employee-organization bonds are now more transitory than they have been in the past, and that as a result the relationship is more transactional than relational (Rousseau 1995). Building from these observations researchers have found that employees in non-standard jobs, especially those that are transitory, are less likely than standard workers to be committed to organizations and to engage in behaviors that demonstrate their commitment to the organization (e.g., Ang and Slaughter 2001; Chattopadhyay and George 2001; Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 2002). What then is the consequence for organizations that have a large number of employees who are relatively transient? Leanna and Rousseau (2000) would suggest that these transitory relationships would seriously compromise the organization's 'relational wealth,' defined as the 'value created by and for a firm through its internal relations among and with employees, as well as its external alliances and reputation' (Leanna and Rousseau 2000, p. 4).

In this study we look at one manifestation of a firm's relational wealth – the extent to which employees are willing to exert extra-role or citizenship behaviors on behalf of the organization. These behaviors represent employees' willingness to go beyond the explicit terms of a job contract, with uncertain immediate returns for the employee. We examine

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one category of non-standard worker – workers who are employees of temporary staffing agencies, but who conduct their primary work at client sites. This category of non-standard worker provides us the opportunity to study the relationship between individuals and organizations in multiple ways. First, because these workers interact with two organizations, one proximally and one more distally, they provide us a context to study if citizenship behaviors are differentially related to the forms of contact with organizations. Second, these workers vary on the extent to which they view temporary work as a means to a ‘permanent’ job or an end in itself. We can thus examine whether extra-role behaviors are related to the employment motivations of individuals. Also, we expect that workers might vary in the extent to which they are amenable to organizational attempts to tie them into the organization, or to build relational wealth.

Three questions guide this research. First, we examine if there is a difference between voluntary and involuntary temporary workers in the extent to which they display extra-role behaviors aimed at the agency and the client. This question helps explore whether there are differences in the relational wealth created with organizations using different employment arrangements, and if this varies with the motivation of workers. Second, we ask if firms can shape the extra-role behaviors of temporary employees by using practices, such as the provision of training and supervisory support, to tie these workers to them. Finally, we examine whether extra-role behaviors aimed at the client and the employer differentially impact the temporary workers’ subsequent job outcomes, focusing on hourly wages, hours worked, and duration of employment. This question helps determine whether there are real consequences for temporary workers in building relationships with the client organization as well as with the temporary agency.

This research contributes to the growing body of work on the causes and consequences of non-traditional work (see Ashford et al. 2007, for a summary). Specifically, we contribute to three areas of knowledge. Citizenship by non-traditional workers has been studied with mixed results (Pearce 1993), leading van Dyne and Ang (1998) to argue that there is a need to explore more moderators of this relationship. We look at one moderator that to our knowledge has not been studied – the extent to which temporary workers’ motivation for doing temporary work affects their citizenship behaviors. We argue that this is an important moderator since temporary workers are too often treated as an undifferentiated group of contingent workers, ignoring the impact that motivations for taking on temporary work have been shown to have on workers’ attitudes towards organizations (e.g., Holtom, Lee and Tidd 2002). We also contribute to the small body of research that examines individuals who straddle multiple organizations and the consequence of this work arrangement (Benson 1998; George and Chattopadhyay 2005). While others have looked at differences in attitudes such as commitment towards each organization we go a step further and examine the labor market consequences associated with the differing levels of attachment with each organization.

In the following sections we develop our arguments and present our empirical study. First we examine the motivations of temporary workers as a predictor of the extent to which they engage in citizenship behaviors. We then develop arguments about how the relationship between temporary workers and organizations predicts extra role behaviors. Finally we consider the longer term outcomes for temporary workers of engaging in extra role behaviors.

### **Relations between temporary workers and organizations**

The decision to display citizenship behavior has been conceptualized as a social dilemma wherein the individual is uncertain whether to display these positive behaviors that are

unlikely to have an immediate individual payoff, but are beneficial to the group at large (Joireman, Kamdar, Daniels and Duell 2006).<sup>1</sup> In other words, individuals are likely to engage in citizenship behaviors when they have some degree of certainty that they can recoup the costs of engaging in those behaviors. Since temporary workers by definition have relatively limited engagements in client organizations they are unlikely to display extra-role behaviors aimed at those organizations because they are unsure of whether they will be around long enough to get pay back from their citizenship behaviors. Further, Joireman et al.'s (2006) work implies that since temporary workers are likely to be more certain of the longevity of their relationship with the temporary help agency rather than with the client, they will focus their citizenship behaviors on the agency. These arguments, however, do not take into account explicitly the individuals' motivations for doing temporary work, and thus for their association with either organization. Even if a relationship is known to last for a short time, the individual might engage in citizenship behaviors if there is the possibility that those behaviors will help the individual gain a longer term goal. It is plausible, for example, that if one's intent is to do temporary work in order to gain a 'permanent' job, then the client gains importance in the worker's mind since he or she might supply permanent work in that organization. Our argument then suggests that the motivation of the individuals for doing temporary work lies at the heart of their decision to engage in citizenship behaviors aimed at the client or the agency.

Coming at this phenomenon from a different angle, Holtom et al. (2002) argue that the job attitudes and performance of non-standard workers can be explained using congruence theory models which predict that an individual's attitudes towards organizations are a function of the extent to which they get the job-related outcomes that they desire. In other words, those who are voluntarily temporary workers value this work arrangement and will engage in positive behaviors towards the organization. On the other hand, working in an arrangement involuntarily is associated with lower general and facet job satisfaction (Ellingson, Gruys and Sackett 1998).

One explanation for this observed association is that incongruence between one's preferences and outcomes sets up an automatic correction mechanism which results in employees revising downwards their affect towards the organization or their job. Further, temporary work is often seen as less prestigious in organizations (Chattopadhyay and George 2001), perhaps because it is associated with jobs that are generally low in technical and informational complexity (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993), and with workers who are lower skilled and peripheral (Heckscher 1988; Colclough and Tolbert 1990; Tilly 1992). Thus, for individuals who are involuntarily temporary, the discomfort of being in a job situation that is not of their choice is exacerbated by the perception that this type of job is stigmatized in the organization.

In contrast, those who are voluntarily temporary might not be concerned by the low status associated with temporary jobs, or might not look to their jobs to enhance their social identities. Ellingson et al. (1998) found that the more voluntary the decision to take on temporary work the more satisfied individuals were with their jobs, but their performance was unaffected. Tan and Tan (2002) observed that there was a positive relationship between an individual's desire to work as a temporary worker in order to gain workplace skills and subsequent performance. More generally, Holtom et al. (2002) found that the greater the congruence between employees' preferences for full- or part-time work, schedule, shift and number of hours and the work arrangement that they have, the more positive were their work related attitudes as well as their performance.

The arguments suggest that incongruence between employees' preferences and what they receive from an organization will always have negative effects on the employees'

attitudes and behaviors. We propose that though this logic seems to hold in most cases, there is at least one circumstance where the relationship might be modified. We would expect that individuals who are voluntarily temporary are likely to display more extra-role behaviors towards the agency than are those who want permanent employment as quickly as possible because the agency is instrumental in getting them more and/or better assignments. We expect this to be the case both for those who prefer temporary work as a long-term option, and for those who prefer it for as long as it takes to find the best permanent job. Both of these groups should benefit more from displaying extra-role behaviors toward the agency than those looking to take the first permanent job that meets the individual's minimum threshold for desirability.

In contrast, we expect that temporary workers who want permanent employment as quickly as possible will demonstrate higher levels of extra-role behaviors aimed at the client organization than would the temporary workers who prefer short-term temporary employment. The latter have much less to gain by displaying extra-role behaviors toward the client, given that they are not seeking permanent employment from the client. Temporary workers may view the client organization as instrumental in providing them with the type of work arrangement that they prefer.

*Hypothesis 1a:* Temporary workers who want permanent employment as quickly as possible are less likely to engage in extra-role behaviors aimed at the agency, compared to temporary workers who prefer temporary work on a longer-term basis or who are using temporary work to find the best permanent job.

*Hypothesis 1b:* Temporary workers who want permanent employment as quickly as possible are more likely to engage in extra-role behaviors aimed at the client, compared to individuals who prefer temping only as a short-term employment option.

### ***Extra-role behaviors on account of contact between workers***

The arguments above present a very instrumental view of temporary workers suggesting their actions are driven largely by the desire to maximize gains for themselves. Yet it is plausible that individuals act positively towards organizations simply because they like the organization. This alternative, yet complementary, view suggests that temporary workers develop favorable attitudes towards organizations based on their contact with members of the organization. Research on citizenship behaviors has found that individuals engage in citizenship behaviors to the extent that they like their colleagues (Chattopadhyay 1999).

How do these positive attitudes develop towards organizations? One mechanism is through repeated exposure to members of the organization (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978). Interactions with members of the organization can provide individuals with information about the organization and what it stands for. A recent meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) found support for Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis, showing that greater contact between members of different groups reduces inter-group prejudice and hostility. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) argue that the contact hypothesis is supported because contact between groups helps reduce intergroup anxiety and feelings of threat and uncertainty. When temporary workers interact with their client and their agency they are likely to gain adequate information to form an impression of that organization that might motivate them to expend effort on its behalf. Broschak and Davis-Blake (2006) found that greater non-task related interactions between standard and non-standard workers (part-time workers

and temporary workers) was positively related to coworker relations as reported by all workers.

One of the features of life as a temporary worker is that on a daily basis one has more contact with members of the client organization than with members of the temporary help agency. Purely on the basis of this contact, employees are likely to have a richer, more nuanced understanding of the client organization relative to their understanding of the agency. George and Chattopadhyay (2005) found that contract workers had more positive relationships with members in their client organizations than in the temporary help agency, despite being associated with both organizations for roughly equivalent lengths of time. Thus, building our arguments on the levels of contact with each organization we would predict that temporary workers are likely to engage in more extra-role behaviors aimed at the client than at the temporary agency.

*Hypothesis 2a:* Temporary workers are likely to engage in more extra-role behaviors aimed at the client organization than the temporary help agency.

Further, when all of their contact is with a single client, rather than multiple clients, temporary workers are likely to form an even stronger bond with that organization, thus displaying higher levels of extra-role behavior aimed at the client than at the agency, in comparison with other temporary workers who have multiple clients. Multiple clients could be cognitively and emotionally taxing, and make salient to the temporary worker the transitory nature of their contact with the organization (Gutek, Bhappu, Liao-Troth, and Cherry 1999; Gutek, Groth, and Cherry 2002). As a result they would be less likely to display extra-role behaviors towards their current client than would temporary workers who had a single client over the previous year.

*Hypothesis 2b:* Temporary workers who worked with one client over the previous year are likely to engage in more extra-role behaviors aimed at the client organization than at the temporary help agency, in comparison with temporary workers who had multiple clients in the previous year.

### ***Organizational actions that build bonds with temporary workers***

Much of the research on employee attitudes in non-standard work arrangements uses social exchange to suggest that these workers have limited attachment to the organization on account of the limited attachment that the organization has towards them (e.g., Pearce 1993; Smith 1998; Davis-Blake, Broschak and George 2003; George 2003; Kunda, Barley and Evans 2002). While some argue that reciprocity norms between individuals and organizations are built on organizations providing job security or investment in the employees' career development (e.g., Pearce 1998), others suggest that employees react positively to organizations where they are treated fairly and have a stimulating work environment (e.g., George 2003). Temporary workers may respond positively not only to organizational practices and procedures, but also the quality of relationships that they have in the organization (George and Chattopadhyay 2005). Raghuram, Garud, Wiesenfeld and Gupta (2001) found workers adjusted more easily to virtual work when they had more trust in their supervisors and peers and when they were more aware of organizational issues that could affect their career plans. Thus, temporary workers are likely to respond positively to a broad array of organizational practices and conditions that suggest that the organization is supportive of them. We consider three actions taken by organizations that might positively shape the relationship between temporary workers and organizations: the

provision of role clarity (Smith 1994); opportunities to grow and develop professionally (Pearce 1998); and support from supervisors (George and Chattopadhyay 2005). The first action, the provision of role clarity, is important for temporary workers who are expected to quickly learn and perform in new environments. The second, opportunities through work to grow and develop professionally, is important for temporary workers to maintain marketable skills for the external labor market (O'Mahony and Bechky 2006). Finally, support from a supervisor at the client and the agency is important for temporary workers because these supervisors make decisions that materially affect the temporary workers' experience at work (George and Chattopadhyay 2005), and because interpersonal relationships are important shapers of attitudes of non-standard workers (Bartel and Dutton 2001).

*Hypothesis 3:* Temporary workers are likely to engage in more extra-role behaviors aimed at the client and temporary agency to the extent that these organizations provide them (Hypothesis 3a) role clarity, (Hypothesis 3b) support from supervisors and (Hypothesis 3c) opportunities to grow professionally.

### ***Impacts of reciprocity on the employment relationship – a longitudinal perspective***

Although citizenship behaviors are by definition not part of the requirements of the job and are thus not part of the formal reward regime of the organization, firms can have reward and recognition programs for being a good corporate citizen and going beyond immediate job requirements. Researchers have long argued that these positive extra-role behaviors are displayed by individuals in the hope of future returns from the organization (Smith, Organ and Near 1983; Chattopadhyay 1999). For temporary employees who rely on the temporary agency to provide access to ongoing opportunities to work and advancement as a temporary worker, the rewards for displaying extra-role behaviors could include better employment outcomes such as assignments that provide greater compensation and longevity of employment.

*Hypothesis 4a and 4b:* Temporary workers who exhibit more extra-role behaviors toward the agency will garner subsequent temporary work assignments that provide greater income in terms of (Hypothesis 4a) hours worked and (Hypothesis 4b) wages earned per hour, compared to temporary workers who exhibit fewer extra-role behaviors toward the agency.

*Hypothesis 4c:* Temporary workers who exhibit more extra-role behaviors toward the agency will have longer duration employment relationships with the agency compared to temporary workers who exhibit fewer extra-role behaviors toward the agency.

Moreover, greater relational wealth with the client could be viewed positively by the temporary help agency because greater client satisfaction should increase the potential for more business in the future. If so, then the two types of relational wealth, that with the client and that with the agency, are complementary and the interests of the temporary agency and the client coincide when the client organization is satisfied with the work of the temporary worker. Thus temporary workers who are able to keep the client happy through more extra-role behaviors should be viewed positively by both the client and the temporary help agency and thus will have more positive work outcomes.

- Hypothesis 5a and 5b:* Temporary workers who exhibit more extra-role behaviors toward the client organization will garner subsequent temporary work assignments that provide greater income in terms of (Hypothesis 5a) hours worked and (Hypothesis 5b) wages earned per hour, compared to temporary workers who exhibit fewer extra-role behaviors toward the client organization.
- Hypothesis 5c:* Temporary workers who exhibit more extra-role behaviors toward the client organization will have longer duration employment relationships with the temporary help agency compared to temporary workers who exhibit fewer extra-role behaviors toward the client organization.

## **Methodology**

### ***Sample***

Data were collected between March 2001 and March 2002 from temporary workers in the US who worked for two large staffing firms. We sent questionnaires to 27,098 individuals in a national sample of employees as follows: 20,598 to industrial and office workers and 6,500 to professional/technical (i.e., technical and managerial) workers. In order to focus on people who have more extensive experience as temporary workers, those selected to receive the survey had to have 'temped' for a minimum of 80 hours in a six month period before the data collection began; this excluded about one-third of the workers at these agencies. In order to induce as high a response rate as possible, all survey respondents were entered in a draw for a bonus payment. Respondents were assured that their individual responses would not be seen by either the agency or the client organization. We received completed questionnaires from 4,500 individuals representing a response rate of 16.6%. Follow-up phone calls were made to a subset of the industrial and clerical temporary worker non-respondents. The calls were made about eight weeks after the survey mailing date. The results suggested an additional 22.5% of the survey non-respondents should be excluded from the total because they were not at the address to which the survey had been mailed. Doing so yields an adjusted response rate of 21.4% (4,500/21,001) for the entire sample. The survey data was then matched by the researchers to archival data on the temporary workers' employment histories at the staffing firms.

As the surveyed temporary workers were sampled from archival wage records, we were able to use those records to compare the respondents and non-respondents. Over 70% of respondents worked for the agency at which they were surveyed in the two months before the survey mailing date; only about 55% of those not responding worked for the agency during this period; thus, the transient nature of temporary employment probably contributed to the low response rate. During the preceding four-and-a-half years, the respondents had greater numbers of hours worked (1,568 average versus 1,137), higher average hourly wages (\$12.32 average versus \$11.18), and greater growth in base pay (13.17% average versus 11.03%). Thus respondents were better-paid and worked as temporary workers for more hours than non-respondents, potentially reducing the variance in these variables. If so our data provide us with conservative tests of our hypotheses.

Of the respondents 43% were male and 57% were female. The average age of the respondents was 37.9 years. Educationally, 24% had high school education, 7% had trade certification, 63% had some undergraduate education, and 6% had a graduate or professional degree.

Before the main survey was sent to the respondents we used focus groups to pilot test the items that were new to the literature on a small sample of temporary workers and temporary agency managers to gauge the clarity of the wording. Based on the pilot test we amended the wording of items so that they were meaningful within this particular context. Most of our measures were adaptations of established scales, except for the measures of role clarity and the voluntariness of temporary work. We used the responses from both the temporary workers and feedback from the agencies to create both of these measures. The measure of the extent to which the temporary work was voluntary or not, took into account the two extremes of individuals who wanted any permanent work as quickly as possible (i.e., temporary work is not at all voluntary), and individuals who wanted temporary work on an on-going basis (temporary work was voluntary). More details of this measure are below.

*Extra role behaviors* A four-item scale was adapted for this context from Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman and Setter's (1990) measure of organizational citizenship behaviors (All items are listed in Table 1). Sample items include 'I volunteer to do things for this organization,' 'I help others at this organization with their responsibilities,' and 'I assist others working for this organization to the firm's benefit.' The scale items range from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The scale for behaviors targeted toward the temporary agency has an alpha of .84; the scale for the client organization has an alpha of .78.

*Role clarity* A three-item scale was created for this study based on the findings from the focus group. Sample items include 'The work I'm expected to do is very clearly defined, and what counts as good performance is clearly understood.' These scales use the

Table 1. Confirmatory factor-item loading.

<i>Factors and items</i>	<i>Loading (client)</i>	<i>Loading (agency)</i>
<i>Extra role behavior</i>		
I volunteer to do things for this organization	.61	.66
I help others at this organization with their responsibilities	.71	.78
I assist others working for this organization to the firm's benefit	.75	.81
I get involved to benefit this organization	.74	.81
<i>Role clarity</i>		
The work I'm expected to do is very clearly defined	.75	.77
What counts as good performance is clearly understood	.70	.72
The terms of my employment are clearly defined	.65	.67
<i>Supervisory support</i>		
Treats me with kindness and respect	.85	.81
Treats me fairly, overall	.88	.82
Provides me with timely feedback	.79	.84
Encourages me to develop myself	.76	.78
Considers my personal needs	.83	.84
Deals with me in an honest and open manner	.84	.88
Keeps me well informed	.84	.87
<i>Development opportunities (alpha = .85)</i>		
Opportunity to learn new things through training		.62
Opportunity to learn from other people at the workplace		.81
Opportunity to learn new things on the job		.83
Work that is closely matched to my skills and abilities		.70
Interesting work		.71

Note:  $N = 4171$ . Factor loadings are completely standardized. All factor loadings are significant at  $p < .01$ .

same anchors as the extra-role behaviors scales. Role clarity with the temporary agency has an alpha of .76. Role clarity with the client organization has an alpha of .74.

*Development opportunities* A five-item scale was developed for this study building on the work of Birdi, Allan and Warr (1997). Respondents were asked to what extent has their experience of temporary work provided them with the following: opportunity to learn new things through training, opportunity to learn from other people at the workplace, opportunity to learn new things on the job, work that is closely matched to their skills and abilities, and interesting work. The scale items range from not at all (1) to very great extent (5). The scale has an alpha of .85.

*Supervisor support* A seven-item scale was adapted from the perceived organizational support measures of Eisenberger and his colleagues (Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison and Sowa 1986; Eisenberger, Fasolo and Davis-LaMastro 1990). Respondents indicated the extent to which they agreed with statements about how their supervisor treated them. Sample items include 'my supervisor treats me with kindness and respect, treats me fairly, provides me with timely feedback, and keeps me well informed.' These scales use the same anchors as the extra-role behaviors scales. Agency supervisor support has an alpha of .94. Client supervisor support has an alpha of .94.

*Voluntariness of temporary work* The survey respondents were asked to choose their main reason for signing on with the staffing agency: (a) to find short-term, temporary or contract work; (b) to find good temporary or contract assignments on an ongoing basis; (c) to find a permanent job as quickly as possible; or (d) to find the right permanent position that meets my needs. For the analysis, those looking for a permanent job as quickly as possible are the base group, and indicator (0, 1) variables were included for each of the other three groups. A separate question recorded whether the person had already stopped temping by the time of the survey because they had found a permanent job; anyone responding positively to this question was excluded from the analysis. This was done to minimize recall bias because those who had already found permanent jobs might have misclassified their original intent for becoming a temporary worker, as well as their self-reported extra-role behaviors toward both the agency and client organizations.

*Labor market outcomes* We used archival records to construct three measures that were used as dependent variables in Hypothesis 5. These include (i) *hourly wage growth* as a temporary worker in the nine months following the survey, (ii) *hours worked per week* as a temporary worker in the nine months following the survey, and (iii) *tenure with the staffing agency* in the year after the survey (categorical variable equal to one for those with positive hours worked, zero otherwise).

*Control variables* We included a number of variables as controls in our models because previous research has shown them to be significant predictors of attitudes towards organizations (Price 1977; Mobley 1982). Thus we included *age* which was coded as a dummy variable for each five year age range from 20–64, and for those 65 or older (with those 19 or younger serving as the base group); *gender* which was coded as a dummy variable with a value of 1 for females; *education* which was coded as two dummy variables for those with (a) some college or an associates degree, and (b) those with bachelors degrees or higher, and (c) *number of dependents* which was entered as a continuous variable.

We also controlled for several aspects of individuals' prior work history that previous research (Finegold, Levenson and Van Buren 2005) suggested could be related to their hours worked and wages as temporary workers: (a) percentage of time in paid work before joining the agency; (b) whether the person lost a job in the 3 years before joining the agency (categorical variable where 1 = yes); (c) whether the person was not looking for work or retired immediately before joining the agency (categorical variable where

1 = yes); (d) whether a student at the time of the survey (categorical variable where 1 = yes); (e) whether they had reliable transportation to get to work (categorical variable where 1 = yes); (f) the extent to which their total family income depends on their income from temporary work (five-item scale ranging from very little to nearly all); (g) whether they worked in another job in addition to temping (categorical variable where 1 = yes); (h) whether they were simultaneously signed up at other staffing agencies (categorical variable where 1 = yes); and (i) whether they received training as a temporary worker (categorical variable where 1 = yes).

From the archival records the following variables were constructed for the analysis: (a) the average hourly wage as a temporary worker in the 12 months before the survey; and (b) two indicator variables for whether the temporary work assignment that immediately preceded the survey was either white collar/office or technical/professional (blue collar is the excluded group).

## Results

### *Confirmatory factor analyses*

We conducted two sets of confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) on the four multi-item variables in the study: *extra role behaviors*; *role clarity*; *development opportunities*; and *supervisor support*. One CFA took into account the factor structure as it relates to measures regarding the client organization, and the second considered the factor structure relating to the agency. Analysis of the *a priori* four-factor measurement model for the agency revealed a good fit of the model ( $\chi^2 (146, N = 4171) = 3715.39, p < .01$ ). The normed-fit-index (NFI), non-normed-fit-index (NNFI) and comparative-fit-index (CFI) exceeded .90 (.92, .90 and .93, respectively), the standardized-root-mean-square-residual (SRMR) was .07, and all factor loadings were moderately high. Similarly, analysis of the *a priori* four-factor measurement model for the client revealed a good fit of the model ( $\chi^2 (74, N = 4171) = 2373.72, p < .01$ ). The NFI, NNFI, and CFI exceeded .90 (.93, .90 and .93, respectively), the SRMR was .08, and all factor loadings were moderately high. The specific items and the item loadings for the four factors are provided in Table 1. Although the chi-square statistic was significant for the model, given the other supportive results, the measurement model was deemed to demonstrate good fit (Anderson and Gerbing 1984).

Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, correlations and inter-item reliability statistics. As shown in Table 2, the inter-item reliabilities of all the scales were acceptable because they were all greater than .70 (DeVellis 1991).

### *Test of hypotheses*

Successful organizations are able to motivate workers to engage in both in-role and extra-role behaviors. We focused our analysis on extra-role behaviors because, as the concepts' names suggest, there is likely to be greater variation in these behaviors toward both the client and agency. This choice was supported by our data which confirmed that the standard deviation for extra-role behaviors was higher (and the means lower) than for in-role behaviors; the mean for extra-role behavior aimed at the agency was 3.57 (sd = .94), and at the client was 4.17 (sd = .75) compared to 4.53 (sd = .68), and 4.67 (sd = .56) respectively for in-role behaviors.

The data used to test Hypotheses 1 and 3 were collected using a single instrument and could thus be affected by the same instrument bias. Since both the independent and



18. Not looking for work or retired before agency	.13	.34	-.06	.00	.03	.04	.03	.04	.03	.06	-.02	.24	.06	-.11	-.14	.01	.11	.05	-.04	-.34	-.15	-						
19. Currently a student	.15	.36	.01	-.03	.02	-.03	.04	.01	.04	.10	.02	-.05	-.04	-.37	-.02	.07	-.16	-.14	-.09	.17	-	-						
20. Has reliable transportation to get to work	.96	.19	-.02	.07	-.02	.03	.01	.05	.04	.04	.01	-.03	-.01	.07	.03	.05	-.01	.05	.02	.03	-.01	-						
21. Total family income depends on temporary work	3.28	1.38	.01	.05	-.05	-.04	-.05	-.05	.10	-.23	-.06	.13	.13	-.09	-.10	.08	-.08	.19	.14	-.20	-.04	-.01	-					
22. Working another job in addition to temping (1 = yes)	.16	.36	.01	-.01	.01	.00	.02	.01	-.03	.04	-.01	-.03	.00	-.06	-.06	.04	-.10	.03	-.04	-.07	.04	-.03	-.03	-				
23. Signed up at more than one staffing agency(1 = yes)	.33	.47	.03	-.02	-.02	-.08	-.06	-.12	-.03	-.09	-.01	.07	.02	.04	-.03	.03	-.01	.04	.13	-.14	-.09	-.01	.10	-.04	-			
24. Received training as a temp (1 = yes)	.24	.43	.13	.04	.11	.06	.15	.07	.20	-.06	.04	-.03	.03	-.04	.13	.01	.02	.03	-.01	-.03	.02	.03	.02	.01	.00	-		
25. Average hourly temporary work wage before survey	13.5	10.2	-.18	.08	-.18	-.06	-.11	.01	-.02	.05	.16	-.10	-.11	.23	-.25	.41	.02	.18	.03	-.01	-.09	.09	.16	-.03	-.03	-.08	-	
26. Worked white collar temporary assignments (1 = yes)	.45	.50	.06	.05	.12	.04	.08	.04	.07	.09	.08	-.09	-.07	-.03	.48	-.01	-.07	-.12	-.05	.11	.05	.02	-.18	-.02	.00	.16	-.29	-
27. Worked technical/professional temporary assignments (1 = yes)	.30	.46	-.17	.06	-.22	-.11	-.13	-.02	.01	-.03	.03	-.01	.00	.11	-.33	.36	.00	.18	.08	-.04	.01	.09	.19	.00	-.01	-.09	.60	-.60

Notes: All correlations higher than .04 are significant at  $p < .05$ ; \*Figures in parentheses indicate inter-item reliabilities.

Table 3. Regression results for agency and client extra-role behaviors.

	<i>Agency extra role behaviors</i>	<i>Client extra-role behaviors</i>
Want to be a temporary worker for short time	-.013 (.064)	-.113** (.054)
Want to be a temporary worker on ongoing basis	.050 (.051)	-.062 (.043)
Want to find the right permanent job	.134*** (.048)	.057 (.041)
Role clarity with the temporary agency	.219*** (.026)	-.054** (.022)
Role clarity with the client organization	-.066*** (.025)	.173*** (.021)
Agency supervisor support	.205*** (.022)	-.020 (.018)
Client supervisor support	-.015 (.021)	.117*** (.018)
Development opportunities	.132*** (.023)	.147*** (.019)
Age 20–24	-.093 (.090)	.020 (.076)
Age 25–29	-.165* (.094)	-.042 (.079)
Age 30–34	-.057 (.096)	-.013 (.081)
Age 35–39	-.018 (.095)	-.040 (.080)
Age 40–44	-.032 (.095)	.033 (.080)
Age 45–49	-.065 (.097)	.068 (.082)
Age 50–54	-.057 (.099)	.096 (.083)
Age 55–59	.072 (.101)	.149* (.085)
Age 60–64	.109 (.110)	.168* (.093)
Age 65 or older	.256** (.125)	.292*** (.105)
Female	-.130*** (.039)	-.025 (.033)
Some college/degree	.022 (.046)	.029 (.038)
Bachelors degree or higher	-.114** (.056)	.040 (.047)
Number of dependents	.013 (.013)	.000 (.011)
% of time in paid work in 3 years before agency	.001 (.001)	.0014*** (.0005)
Lost job in 3 years before joining the agency	.004 (.037)	.039 (.031)
Not looking for work or retired before agency	-.120** (.055)	.051 (.047)
Currently a student	.051 (.054)	-.016 (.045)

Table 3. Continued.

	<i>Agency extra role behaviors</i>	<i>Client extra-role behaviors</i>
Has reliable transportation to get to work	-.042 (.089)	.110 (.075)
Total family income depends on temporary work income	.017 (.013)	.019* (.011)
Working another job in addition to temping	.006 (.046)	.029 (.039)
Signed up at more than one staffing agency	.068* (.037)	.017 (.031)
Received training as a temp	.100** (.040)	-.017 (.034)
Average hourly temporary work wage before survey	-.007*** (.002)	.002 (.002)
Worked white collar temporary assignments	-.070 (.048)	.189*** (.041)
Worked technical/professional temporary assignments	-.193*** (.058)	.139*** (.049)
Constant	1.887*** (.164)	2.286 (.138)
N	2418	2418
Adjusted R-squared	.257	.174

Note: Significance: \* = .10; \*\* =  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*\* =  $p \leq .01$ .

dependent variables in Hypothesis 3 are self-reported perceptions or behaviors we ran the Harman single-factor test (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee and Podsakoff 2003) to determine whether the relationships that we found could be attributed to response-response bias. We ran the exploratory factor analysis separately for the client-related data and the agency-related data. The results showed that we had a four factor solution reflecting the four key constructs in this study for each target organization, extra-role behaviors, role clarity, development opportunities, and supervisor support. Since there was no single factor accounting for the majority of the variance in both cases (client and agency data) we deemed it less likely that common method variance explains the pattern of results in this study.

We tested Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 3 by regressing workers' self-reported extra-role behaviors on the control (demographic, work history, and related) and independent

Table 4. Client versus agency extra-role behaviors: means comparisons.

	<i>All temporary workers</i>	<i>Number of clients in previous year</i>		<i>Difference in differences</i>
		<i>One</i>	<i>Multiple</i>	
Client extra-role behaviors	4.17 (s.d. .753)	4.20 (s.d. .743)	4.11 (s.d. .771)	
Agency extra-role behaviors	3.57 (s.d. .942)	3.51 (s.d. .961)	3.71 (s.d. .885)	
Client-Agency extra-role behaviors	0.60	t = 31.5, p ≤ .01	0.40 0.69	0.29
		t = 28.7, p ≤ .01	t = 14.0, p ≤ .01	Chi-square = 45.9, p ≤ .01

Table 5. Regression and probit results for employment outcomes.

	<i>Hourly wage growth</i>	<i>Hours worked per week</i>	<i>Tenure with agency</i>
Extra-role behaviors toward the temporary agency	-.129 (.318)	-.160 (.225)	.044*** (.016)
Extra-role behaviors toward the client organization	.936** (.398)	.605** (.282)	-.033 (.020)
Temporary work weekly hours worked pre-survey		.821*** (.024)	
Want temporary work for short time	1.090 (1.045)	-.615 (.745)	.017 (.053)
Want temporary work on ongoing basis	1.976** (.806)	-.521 (.573)	.070* (.041)
Want to find the right permanent job	1.273* (.752)	-.083 (.527)	.034 (.038)
Age 20–24	2.498* (1.398)	-.646 (.980)	-.139** (.067)
Age 25–29	2.083 (1.455)	-1.019 (1.021)	-.048 (.072)
Age 30–34	.546 (1.488)	-.727 (1.043)	-.052 (.074)
Age 35–39	.678 (1.485)	.122 (1.042)	-.021 (.074)
Age 40–44	1.897 (1.500)	-.297 (1.051)	.118 (.074)
Age 45–49	1.276 (1.535)	-.250 (1.077)	-.075 (.076)
Age 50–54	1.146 (1.558)	.028 (1.093)	.050 (.078)
Age 55–59	1.025 (1.606)	-.827 (1.126)	.156* (.078)
Age 60–64	.318 (1.717)	-.832 (1.205)	.165* (.083)
Age 65 or older	.176 (1.981)	.460 (1.390)	.141 (.097)
Female	-.487 (.556)	-.262 (.392)	-.011 (.028)
Some college/AA degree	.046 (.664)	.018 (.466)	.045 (.034)
Bachelor's degree or higher	.408 (.809)	.431 (.568)	.030 (.041)
Number of dependents	-.240 (.214)	-.081 (.150)	.000 (.011)
% of time in paid work in 3 years before agency	-.003 (.010)	.022*** (.007)	.000 (.000)
Lost job in 3 years before joining the agency	-.903 (.581)	-.794* (.407)	-.018 (.029)
Not looking for work or retired before agency	-1.703* (.888)	.614 (.623)	.039 (.045)

Table 5. *Continued.*

	<i>Hourly wage growth</i>	<i>Hours worked per week</i>	<i>Tenure with agency</i>
Currently a student	1.919** (.884)	-.235 (.620)	.010 (.045)
Has reliable transportation to get to work	.422 (1.459)	1.425 (1.026)	.131* (.070)
Constant	-1.315 (2.563)	0.925 (1.900)	NA <sup>1</sup>
N	1458	1458	1458
Adjusted R-squared	.0101	.5069	.0362 <sup>2</sup>

Notes: Significance: \* = .10, \*\* =  $p \leq .05$ , \*\*\* =  $p \leq .01$ ;

<sup>1</sup>The tenure probit results have been converted to represent changes in probabilities from a one unit change in the variable, so the constant is not defined.

<sup>2</sup>The probit model fit statistic is the pseudo R-squared.

variables of interest. Table 3 reports the set of regressions results which we use to examine Hypotheses 1a and 1b. As predicted, we find that individuals' motivation for temping is related to their willingness to engage in extra-role behaviors. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, temporary workers whose initial reason for signing on was to find the right permanent job are more likely to engage in extra-role behaviors targeted toward the agency than the base group – those who want a permanent job as quickly as possible. However, there was no difference between those who wanted temporary work on an on-going basis and the base group. Thus, Hypothesis 1a was partially supported by these data. Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, those looking only to work in a temporary job on a short-term basis are less likely to display extra-role behaviors targeted toward the client than did those who want permanent employment as quickly as possible. Hypothesis 1b was fully supported.

To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b we did a t-test to compare the mean values for extra-role behaviors targeted toward the client versus agency for all temporary workers, and separately for those who worked with only one versus multiple clients in the previous year. The top panel in Table 4 provides confirmation of Hypothesis 2a: temporary workers engage in significantly more extra-role behaviors aimed at the client than at the agency (4.17 vs. 3.57), and the difference is statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ). The bottom panel provides confirmation of Hypothesis 2b: the gap in extra-role behaviors targeted at the client versus agency is larger for those temporary workers who worked with only one client in the year preceding the survey (difference-in-differences equal to 0.29), and it is statistically significantly different from zero ( $p < .01$ ).

Hypothesis 3 was tested with the same set of regressions used to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b (see Table 3). In Hypothesis 3a we predicted that greater role clarity would be positively associated with more extra role behaviors. The results show that while greater role clarity with the client is associated with greater extra-role behaviors toward the client, it also is associated with lesser extra-role behaviors toward the agency; and the opposite holds for greater role clarity with the agency. Thus, Hypothesis 3a received mixed support. With regard to the relationship with the temp's immediate supervisor, greater supervisor support from the agency promotes extra-role behaviors targeted at the agency without having any impact (positive or negative) on the client; likewise for supervisor support from the client. These results provide support for Hypothesis 3b. Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 3c job assignments that offer greater opportunities for skill development elicit greater extra role behaviors toward both the agency and the client.

Finally, we tested whether exhibiting more extra-role behaviors results in more positive subsequent job outcomes for temporary workers (Table 5). We regressed the outcome variables, hourly wage growth, hours worked per week, and tenure with the agency on the control variables (demographic, work history, and reasons for taking on temporary work variables) and the variables representing extra-role behaviors aimed at the agency and client organization. The wage growth and hours worked models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. The tenure model was estimated using maximum likelihood probit, and the reported coefficients were converted to represent changes in probabilities from a one unit change in the independent variables. The results provide mixed support for Hypothesis 4: temporary workers who exhibit more extra-role behaviors toward the agency had longer durations of subsequent employment with the agency (supporting Hypothesis 4c), but no greater wage growth (contrary to Hypothesis 4b) or hours worked per week (contrary to Hypothesis 4a). Conversely, temporary workers who reported more extra-role behaviors toward the client organization experienced faster wage growth (supporting Hypothesis 5b) and more hours worked per week (supporting Hypothesis 5a), but, on average, had no difference in their tenure with the agency (contrary to Hypothesis 5c); this provides mixed support for Hypothesis 5.

## **Discussion**

In this paper we examined three broad questions: whether there is a difference between voluntary and involuntary temporary workers in the extent to which they display extra-role behaviors aimed at the agency and the client; if the practices and structures used by organizations to tie workers to them affect those extra-role behaviors; and if extra-role behaviors aimed at the client and the employer differentially impact the temporary workers' subsequent job outcomes.

Our first set of hypotheses examined the extent to which the display of extra-role behaviors can be predicted by the reason that individuals were in their temporary jobs. Our data provided support for the idea that those who are voluntarily in this work arrangement, i.e. those who look at temporary work as a long term option, engage in higher levels of extra-role behaviors aimed at the agency than those who see temporary work as a stop gap arrangement. Since the agency is instrumental in the workers getting their preferred work arrangement, those who are comfortable with being long-term temporary workers appear to engage in behaviors that are helpful to the agency. In contrast, temporary workers who would prefer to find a permanent job as quickly as possible reported the greatest levels of extra-role behaviors aimed at the client organization. This response could possibly be on account of the client organization being seen as a potential long-term employer, particularly in the growing number of organizations who now do some or all of their entry-level hiring through temp-to-perm arrangements. These patterns are also consistent with rational assessments of the merits of creating relational wealth with different parties in the employment relationship.

Our second set of hypotheses proposed that temporary workers would display more extra-role behaviors towards the organization with which it had more intense contact (Allport 1954). The data supported our arguments showing that temporary workers, on average, reported the display of more extra-role behaviors aimed at their clients than at the agency. Further, those with multiple clients in the previous year reported less extra-role behaviors aimed at the client than those with a single client in the previous year. While we do not explicitly measure the level of contact with each of the organizations we do know that the temporary workers in our sample all worked at the client sites, rather than at the

agency, thus lending weight to our argument that they had greater contact with the client than the agency.

Another way of interpreting our findings is that, in order to be successful, temporary workers have to conform to the norms of and please the client – thus extra-role behaviors targeted toward the client can improve the probability of continued employment on the assignment and/or the probability of being offered a permanent position. Because temporary workers have very little interaction with the temporary work agency (when not on assignment with the client they are not working with the agency, unless they come in for training) it may be hard for them to know what types of extra-role behaviors are appropriate for the agency only. Their embedded work with the client, in contrast, gives them direct access to the information that enables them to know and display the appropriate extra-role behaviors for the client. We tested this idea indirectly by comparing the levels of role clarity in the agency and the client. The data showed that there was no difference in the levels of role clarity that temporary workers experience at the client organization and at the agency. This provides indirect support for the idea that it is the workers' motivation, rather than their access to information on appropriate norms of behavior, that explains their willingness to engage in extra-role behaviors aimed at the two organizations.

Our third hypothesis examined how temporary workers respond to the environment within which they work. We found that the more opportunities that the temporary worker had for skill development, arguably very critical for those who are active in the external labor market (O'Mahony and Bechky 2006), the greater the levels of extra-role behaviors that they displayed towards both organizations. However, greater role clarity within either organization was related to greater extra-role behaviors towards that organization, and less towards the other. It would suggest that greater levels of clarity associated with a role were also associated with more demands in the performance of that role. Consequently, the extra-role behaviors displayed towards one organization are done at the cost of extra-role behaviors aimed at the other organization. In essence, the two organizations' efforts at providing clarity set up a competition between them for the temporary workers' provision of extra-role behaviors. In the case of supervisory support, each organization's effort is self-promoting without impinging on the temporary workers' relationship with the other organization. Greater supervisory support in an organization was associated with more extra-role behaviors aimed at that organization, but had no relationship with extra-role behaviors aimed at the other organization.

Our last set of hypotheses examined labor market outcomes for temporary workers. The data showed that extra-role behaviors aimed at the client had more types of payoffs for the temporary workers than did extra-role behaviors aimed at the agency. The former was positively related to the hours worked per week and wage growth, while the latter was related only to the duration of subsequent employment with the agency. These results provide some support for our argument that despite the fact that temporary workers have limited engagements with organizations they display citizenship behaviors aimed at those organizations because the organizations can potentially provide them with outcomes that the workers desire.

### ***Limitations and future research***

The data used to test Hypotheses 1 and 3 were collected using a single instrument and could thus be affected by the same instrument bias. The measure of voluntariness of temporary work was a single item forced choice measure, rather than a self-reported behavior, the results relating to Hypotheses 1a and 1b are therefore less likely to be

affected by this bias. As we described earlier, we followed the recommendation of Podsakoff et al. (2003), and found there was no single factor accounting for the majority of the variance in both client and agency data. We thus deemed it less likely that common method variance explains the pattern of results in this study.

Avenues for future research are suggested by some interesting patterns that emerged with respect to demographics. Individuals with more education (bachelor's degree or higher), who were out of the labor force (not looking for work or retired) just before temping, who work in technical/professional temporary work assignments, and who earn high hourly wages exhibit lower extra-role behaviors targeted toward the agency. In contrast, students, those who rely on temporary work for a greater percentage of total family income, and those who received training as a temporary worker exhibit higher extra-role behavior's targeted toward the agency. This pattern of response is suggestive of individuals making calculations of the payoffs that come from extra-role behaviors and acting accordingly. Those who believe they are likely to find permanent work (and therefore are not dependent on the agency) display less extra-role behaviors aimed at the agency. These data provide some support for Joireman et al.'s (2006) conceptualization of citizenship behaviors as a social dilemma in which individuals make calculations of the likelihood of future payoffs. Future research could examine if there are individual differences among temporary workers that can moderate their citizenship behaviors even when payoffs are uncertain.

Future researchers, as well as practitioners in temporary agencies, could also draw on our findings about the importance of understanding individual workers motivations for entering temporary employment. By probing these motivations at the outset of the employment relationship, agencies may be able to do a better job of tailoring assignments and management practices to individual workers and researchers may avoid any retrospective bias in documenting workers' employment objectives. In addition, if it is possible to add a second, follow-up survey to the research design, this would make it possible to test whether extra-role behaviors are associated with greater likelihood of obtaining a permanent job with the client organization.

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### Note

1. We focus on extra-role rather than in-role behaviors because temporary employees have less discretion over their in-role behaviors. During the process that places temporary employees on assignment with the clients of the temporary agency, the agency acts as a take-it-or-leave it matchmaker, looking for the temporary employee who both has the skills to take the assignment and the desire to do so. Temporary employees who accept assignments and subsequently exhibit anything less than high in-role behaviors run the risk of losing that job and not receiving future assignments from the agency. On the other hand, extra-role behaviors are more discretionary than are in-role behaviors (Organ 1988), and represent employees' attitudes and motivations towards their organization and its members.

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